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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the 
Utah Code Annotated. (Utah Supreme Court previously had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code Annotated.) 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant/Plaintiffs Smiths list three issues in their "Statement of Issues." Only the 
first issue listed by Smiths related to summary judgment in favor of Hales & Warner. 
Smiths remaining two issues relate to summary judgment in favor of CPB. 
Hales & Warner addresses and disputes Smiths first issue in, among other points, 
Hales & Warner's points 1 (including its subpoints), 2, 3, 4, and 5 below. Further, Hales & 
Warner addresses and disputes Smiths second listed issue in, among other points, Hales & 
Warner's point 1 and its subpoints, including subpoint 1(A), 1(B), l(B)(i) and 1(C) below. 
Hales & Warner addresses and disputes Smiths third listed issue in, among other points, 
Hales & Warner's point 6 below. 
1. Hales & Warner's first point (or issue) is that Smiths can not meet their burden 
of establishing the "retained control" exception to the general rule of non-liability, (i.e. that 
Hales & Warner owed a duty to Jason Smith based upon Hale & Warner's exertion of 
affirmative control over the injury causing aspect of Jason Smith's work); part of this 
point/issue is that the CPB/Hales & Warner contract does not create a duty (as alleged by 
Smiths). (Hales & Warner also points out relating thereto that even under Smiths' 
erroneously asserted "retained control" standard, no duty is created). This was addressed 
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at the trial court level. (See e ^ R. 922-1020, R. 1059.) 
2. Hales & Warner's second point (or issue) is that this Court should affirm the 
trial court based upon Smiths' stipulation that if the standard in Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 
22? (which case is attached hereto as "Attachment"9M), requires that Hales & Warner exerts 
affirmative control over the "injury causing aspect of the work," then Smiths "lose." Smiths 
made this stipulation to the trial court, and the trial court included this stipulation in the 
Summary Judgment Order. (R. 1059, p. 45,11. 12-25, p. 46,11. 1-6, R. 1036-1043.) 
3. Hales & Warner's third point (or issue) is that Smiths agreed to the trial court in 
the first hearing on the subject motions that the "retained control" required that Hales & 
Warner' exert of affirmative control over "the injury causing aspect" of Jason Smith's 
work. When that stipulation is combined with Smiths' Stipulation referred to in point 2 
above, Smiths have apparently stipulated "away" their case. This first agreement 
(stipulation) was also made to the trial court during oral argument. (R. 1058, p. 30, 37.) 
4. Hales & Warner's fourth point (or issue) is that Smiths' can not meet their 
burden of establishing Hale & Warner "breached" a duty. This issue was briefed and argued 
to the trial court below. (See R. 991-992, and R. 1059, pp. 24-25, 72-74.) 
5. Hales & Warner's fifth point (or issue) is that Smiths' can not meet their burden 
of establishing Hale & Warner "causation." This issue was also briefed and argued to the 
trial court below. (See R. 990-991, R. 1059, pp. 25-29, 72-74.) 
6. Hales & Warner's sixth point (or issue) is that Hales & Warner was an 
independent contractor, and was not the employee of CPB. 
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7. Hales & Warner's seventh point briefly discusses certain problems as to the 
"Reply Brief of the Appellants to the Brief of Appellee CPB." 
As to the standard of review, summary judgment is proper only when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, % 12. An appellate court reviews the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to the district court's 
legal conclusions. IdL 
As to stipulations, they are conclusive and binding on the party making the 
stipulation, (unless good cause is shown for relief); and stipulations made by an attorney 
may not be disregarded or set aside at will See e ^ DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 
P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct. App 1995). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is a civil action, (based upon claimed "negligence"), which action 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Smiths brought against Defendants/Appellees Hales & Warner and the 
CPB. (R. 3-12.) 
B. Course of Proceedings and its Disposition in the Trial Court 
Hales & Warner and the CPB each filed motions for summary judgment, which motions 
were granted. The trial court's "Summary Judgment Order" is attached hereto as Attachment 
" 1 . " (See Summary Judgment Order, Attachment " 1 , " pp. 3-7, R. 1036-1043.) Hales & 
Warner requests that this Court review at this juncture the trial court's "Summary Judgement 
3 
Order," not only because it is the Order appealed from, but because a review of the facts and 
law referred to therein provides background and context for the facts discussed below. 
C. Statement of Undisputed Facts 
The following are undisputed facts. 
Michael Lewis Deposition 
1. Michael Lewis testified in his deposition: 
Q Who did you work for in August of 1999? 
A Egbert Construction. 
(Michael Lewis Deposition, p. 4,11. 23-24, Attachment "2," R. 985.) 
2. As it relates to Hales & Warner Job Superintendent Maurice Egbert, (who has 
no relation to Ken Egbert Construction), and as to other matters, Michael Lewis testified 
as follows: 
Q (by Mr. Badaruddin) I'm just asking you, what did Maurice 
[Egbert of Hales & Warner], if anything, tell you to do? 
The Witness: Really, nothing. Honestly, I never talked to 
Maurice more than one or two words, more than, you know, if I 
needed to ask him a question or something. I never really talked 
to him very much. 
Q (by Mr. Badaruddin) Did he ever tell you you were doing 
something wrong and to stop it? 
A No. That would more be the other framers. 
Q Who showed you how to raise a wall? 
A Ken Egbert [of Egbert Construction]. 
Q Okay. 
A He taught me the proper way, you know, how to stand when 
you're holding the wall. You don't want to stand right up to it. 
You've got to put your foot back, you know, be ready to brace it, 
and bail if it goes out of the way. 
Q Do you remember Jason Smith? 
4 
A Yes. . . . 
Q And what, if anything, did he do, if you know what he did? 
A He was the same as I was; he was a laborer. 
Q And he worked for who? 
A He worked for Ken Egbert. 
Q And did you have any supervisors when you worked with Ken 
Egbert? 
A Oh, man. We had - there was Ken, and I guess one of the other 
supervisors, his name was Mannv. And then there was this guy 
named Dale. . . . 
Q How, if at all, did they supervise you? 
A Like I said, if I was doing something wrong, you know, if I was 
cutting a board wrong, they'd come tell me. 
A . . . Sometimes I would assemble the wall. 
Q How did you know how to assemble a wall? 
A I was taught how. 
Q By? 
A By Manny. 
Q Okay. Did you stand up any walls? 
A Oh, yeah. A lot of walls. 
Q Who told vou how to stand up a wall? 
A Ken Egbert. 
(Michael Lewis Deposition p. 8,11. 12-25, p. 9,11. 1-5, 8-9,15-25, p. 10,11. 1-4, 16-25, p. 11, 
11.1-2, Attachment "2," R. 979-982, brackets and underlining added.) 
3. Thereafter, when separate counsel was questioning Michael Lewis, 
Michael Lewis testified that Maurice Egbert of Hales & Warner never gave instructions to 
Michael Lewis or Jason Smith or Jose as to lifting the subject wall. (Michael Lewis 
Deposition, p. 24,11. 10-19, Attachment "2," R. 983.") 
4. As to the accident, Michael Lewis testified: 
Q Do you remember August 13 of 1999? 




Q Tell me what happened on that day. 
A Well, we had just finished eating lunch, and there was a wall 
that had already been built, and Manny - 1 think it was Manny -
told me and Jason and a guy named Jose to go put it up. 
Q Okay. And then what happened? 
A So we went over there, and we lifted it up, and it wasn't quite 
onto the bolts, so Jason and Jose were holding it, and I went to go 
get a board, and I was going to, you know, try to use the leverage 
and jack it up onto the bolts. And I put it under there, the wall 
came down. Jose bailed out of the way, and it was like Jason, he 
tried to catch it, and he kind of crouched down. I don't know if he 
was trying to catch it or what, it just came down on him. 
And we started yelling for help, and Maurice came out of the trailer, and the 
other guys, everyone else was working on the east - yeah, the east side of the 
church . . . . 
(Michael Lewis Deposition, p. 12,11. 9-25, p. 13,11. 1-3, 9-13, Attachment "2," R. 976-977, 
underlining added.) 
5. Michael Lewis testified that he did not know why the wall started to fall. (Michael 
Lewis Deposition, p. 41,11. 1-12, Attachment "2," R. 975.) 
6. When the wall started to fall, Michael Smith yelled "something, get out of the way, 
something along the lines of that," and Jose also yelled. (Michael Lewis Deposition, p. 41,11. 
22-25, p. 42,11. 1-5, Attachment "2," R. 974-975.) 
7. Michael Lewis went on to testify as to Jason Smith's actions: "If he would have just 
moved to the side rather than backwards, he would have been fine." (Michael Lewis 
Deposition, p. 42,11. 12-13, Attachment "2," R. 974.) 
Maurice Egbert Deposition 
8. Maurice Egbert of Hales & Warner, (and, again, no relation to Egbert 
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Construction), testified in his deposition as follows: 
Q Where were you located when the wall fell on Mr. Smith? 
A I was in the job trailer. 
(Maurice Egbert Deposition, p. 102,11. 6-8, Attachment "3," R. 972.) 
9. Maurice Egbert testified: 
Q Did you ever tell Jason Smith how to place that wall on the 
bolts . . . ? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you ever instruct or tell any Egbert employee how to raise 
that wall or place that wall on the bolts? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you ever prohibit any Egbert employee or any Reynolds 
Construction employee from using the method they chose in 
placing a wall onto bolts for that construction site? 
A No, I did not. 
(Maurice Egbert Deposition, p. 183,11. 5-12, p. 184,11. 7-11, Attachment "3," R. 970-971.) 
10. Maurice testifies as follows as to whether he saw the methodology that was 
used in raising the wall involved in the accident: "I did not see the methodology." 
(Maurice Egbert Deposition, p. 194,11. 1-5, Attachment "3," R. 969.) 
Brent Reynolds Deposition 
11. During his deposition, Brent Reynolds was handed a copy of the Subcontract 
Agreement entered into between Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. and BRC, Inc., and 
testified that he signed that contract as President of BRC, Inc. (Brent Reynolds Deposition, 
p. 49,11. 4-18, Attachment "4," R. 961.) 
12. Brent Reynolds testified: 
Q And the subcontract refers to an amount of $ 156,000. This is 
the subcontract between Hales & Warner and BRC; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And I couldn't hear you too well over here, but did you say 
that your sub-subcontract between BRC and Egbert Construction 
was $72,000? 
A I believe that's correct 
(Brent Reynolds Deposition, p. 50,11. 11-17, Attachment "4," R. 960.) 
13. As to Brent Reynolds Construction, Inc.'s sub-subcontract with Egbert 
Construction, Brent Reynolds testified: 
A I was busy and didn't finish up some other work that I had 
going and couldn't get to this one . . . . so I got Ken Egbert to do 
the work. 
Q Who is Ken Egbert? 
A A contractor. 
Q Did you ask Mr. Egbert to help you out with all aspects of the 
work described on Exhibit 32 or just the framing? What did you 
ask Mr. Egbert to do? 
A Just the framing on it. I told him I would still supply the 
material and he could do the framing on it. 
Q And what is "framing"? 
A Putting the frame structure together, the boards. 
Q The boards? 
A The structure of it. 
Q And the structure - you've got to understand I don't know as 
much about the construction business as you do. 
A Build the walls, put the roof on. 
Q That's something I can understand. You wanted Mr. Egbert to 
build the walls? 
A Yes. 
Q And stand them up? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And what about the men who were going to do all of 
this work? 
A His employees. 
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(Brent Reynolds Deposition, p. 7, 11. 21-24, p. 8, 11. 4-5, 18-25, p. 9 11. 1-12, 18-20, 
Attachment 
"4,"R. 957-959.) 
14. Brent Reynolds testified that other than attending the pre-construction meeting, 
which occurred prior to any framing on the project, he did not again visit the site until after the 
accident, testifying: 
Q Did you ever visit the Highland 4 and 20 project site? 
A During the framing? 
Q At any time. 
A I did at the preconstruction meeting. 
Q Okay. 
A And one time when the roof was being done, I sent some new 
guys down there, and I had to take a paycheck down to them off of 
one of my projects. 
Q So other than those two occasions, you never set foot on the 
property? 
A I went down and cleaned some material up after everything 
was done. 
Q Okay. So other than those three occasions, you never set foot 
on the property? 
A No. 
(Brent Reynolds Deposition, p. 58,11. 4-23, Attachment "4," R. 956.) 
15. At another point in his deposition, Brent Reynolds testified: 
Q Did you, yourself, inspect the site from time to time? 
A No. 
(Reynolds Deposition, p. 53,11. 10-12, Attachment "4," R. 955.) 
16. Brent Reynolds further testified: 
Q So as I understand it, you have no personal knowledge of 
Hales & Warner ever instructing a framing subcontractor or a 
framing subcontractor's employees as to the method in which 
they should raise a wall from the ground to an upright position; is 
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that correct? 
A That's correct 
Q And you have no personal knowledge whether or not Hales & 
Warner every gave any instructions as to any framing 
subcontractor or its employee as to how to hold a wall that has 
not yet been tied into place after it's been raised; is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And ^on have no personal knowledge as to whether Hales & 
Warner ever gave any framing subcontractor instructions as to 
how to put a wall onto the bolts after it's been raised; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
(Brent Reynolds Deposition, p. 47,11. 8-24, Attachment "4," R. 952.) 
Joel Warner Deposition 
17. Joel Warner of Hales & Warner testified in his deposition: 
Q Did you ever give any instructions to the men that were raising 
that wall as to how to raise that wall? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you ever give any instructions to anyone from Brent 
Reynolds Construction or Egbert Construction as to how to raise 
that wall? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever give any instructions at any time to anyone at 
Brent Reynolds Construction or Egbert Construction as to how 
to raise my wall? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever tell anyone else from Hales & Warner, including 
Maurice Egbert, to give instructions to Egbert Construction or its 
employees or Brent Reynolds Construction or its employees as 
to how to raise a particular wall? 
A No. 
(Joel Warner Deposition, p. 99, 11. 14-25, p. 100, 11. 1-6, Attachment "5 ," R. 938A-939.) 
Clifford Hales Deposition 
18. Clifford Hales of Hales & Warner testified that Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. 
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entered the Subcontract with BRC, Inc., (Brent Reynolds Construction Incorporated). 
(Clifford Hales Deposition p. 38,11. 2-9, Attachment "6," R. 932.) 
19. Clifford Hales testified as to Egbert Construction, Inc.: "We didn't have a contract 
with Egbert [Construction]." (Clifford Hales Deposition, p. 40,11. 7-8, Attachment "6," R. 
930, brackets added.) 
20. Clifford Hales testified in his deposition: 
Q Did you ever instruct Maurice Egbert or any other Hales & 
Warner employee to take over from Brent Reynolds or Maurice 
Egbert the framing of the subject wall or the placement of the 
subject wall onto the bolts? 
A No. 
Q You weren't at the scene of the accident on the day of the accident? 
A No. 
Q You personally didn't ever instruct any Egbert employee to 
place the subject wall on the bolts in a certain method or by way 
of a certain operative detail, did you? 
A No. 
(Clifford Hales Deposition, p. 66,11. 21-24, 67,11. 1-9, Attachment "6," R. 922, 929.) 
D. Response to Plaintiffs/Appellants Smiths Statement of "Facts" 
There are a number of problems associated with Smiths' Statement of the "Fact" section 
in Plaintiffs/Appellants Smith brief, many of which problems will be discussed in a number of 
sub-subsections below. 
(1) Appellants Smiths inappropriately attach to their brief many pages of 
various deposition transcripts that are not a part of the "Record on 
Appeal:" and this Court should grant this Appellee Hales & Warner's 
Motion to strike such (and any new issue or arguments raised thereto) 
and/or otherwise disregard such. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure states as to the brief of an appellant: 
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"All statements of fact and references to the preceding below shall be supported by citations 
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) 
(underlining added). Rule 24(e) states: "References shall be made to the pages of the original 
record " S e e Utah R. App. P. 24(e). 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: "This court need not, and will not, 
consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record." See Uckerman v. 
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 588 P.2d 142,144 (Utah 1978). The Utah Supreme 
Court has also pointed out that appellate courts will not consider matters raised for the first 
time on appeal. See Coleman y. Stevens, 200 Ut. 98, f^ 9. 
The Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure also require that an appellant cite to the record 
where an issue is preserved in the trial court. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(a). 
Appellants/Plaintiffs Smiths have attached to Smiths' Brief many deposition 
pages from various depositions which are not part of the "Record" on appeal. In 
Smiths' "Statement of the Facts" section, Smiths cite to this deposition testimony which is not 
part of the "Record." Hales & Warner objects to such, and requests that this Court strike such 
deposition testimony and other references thereto, and any newly alleged issues and 
arguments based thereon. Hales & Warner has filed along with this Brief a Motion to Strike 
Smiths' new deposition testimony and any new issues and arguments, which motion should be 
granted. 
However, even if this court were to consider this new deposition testimony (other than 
hearsay), summary judgment in Hales & Warner's favor is still clearly indicated, as more folly 
12 
discussed below. 
As to what is, and what is not, part of the "Record," in Hales & Warner's initial reply 
memorandum, it attached 5 pages of deposition testimony (that are a part of the "Record") 
from Plaintiffs Kelly Smith and Lisa Nielson depositions. (See R. 677-679, 681-682.) After 
the additional depositions were taken, approximately 57 pages of deposition testimony from 
various deponents,"(as outlined above in Hales & Warner's Statement of Undisputed Facts), 
were submitted with Hales & Warner's "Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Hales 
& Warner Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs"( and are 
contained in the "Record on Appeal") (See R. 922-1020.) CPB submitted with its 
supplemental reply memorandum approximately 28 additional pages from the deposition of 
Dean Schick, (in addition to the deposition pages of Dean Schick previously submitted by 
Hales & Warner), as well as four pages from a deposition of Paul Evans. (See R. 891-912.) 
As indicated by a review of the "Record on Appeal," Plaintiffs/Appellants Smiths did 
not attach any pages of any deposition transcripts to Smiths supplemental memorandum (or any 
other memorandum of Smiths) filed with the trial court as to the motions for summary 
judgment. In Smiths' supplemental memorandum, Smiths do refer to certain deposition pages 
attached to the reply memoranda of Hales & Warner and CPB. In addition thereto, in their 
supplemental memoranda to the trial court, Smiths cited to a small number of additional pages 
of depositions, but fail to attach those additional pages to Smiths supplemental memorandum 
or make them part of the "Record.." 
In Smiths "Brief of Appellant," Smiths attach to their brief for the first time 
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approximately 13 pages of deposition testimony to which Smiths had referred, but did not 
submit, in their supplemental memorandum to the trial court. However, far more 
egregiously, Smiths didn't stop there, but Smiths have also attached to their Brief for 
the first time, (in addition to the 13 pages mentioned immediately above), an additional 96 
pages of deposition testimony from various (7) deponents, which pages of deposition 
testimony: were not submitted to the trial court: are not part of the "Record" on 
appeal: and were never even cited to by Smiths at the trial level. Thus, the total number 
of additional pages of deposition testimony Smiths has attached to Smiths Brief, which 
pages are not part of the "Record" on appeal, is approximately 109 pages. 
In particular, according to Hales & Warner's review of the "Record" on appeal and 
Smiths' Brief, Smiths have inappropriately attached to their Brief the following deposition 
pages from the following depositions, which deposition pages are not a part of the 
"Record" on appeal, and which deposition pages were not even cited to by Smiths in 
their memoranda filed with the trial court: pages 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
25, and 54 from Michael Lewis' deposition transcript; pages 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 
76, 77, 78, 79, 103, 104, and 105 from Maurice Egbert's deposition transcript; pages 6, 11, 
12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23,24, 31, 32, and 48 of Brent Reynolds' deposition transcript; pages 
20, 21, 30, 31, 33, 38, 39, 40,41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 78, 80, 81, 82 , 83, 84, 
and 85 of Joel Warner's deposition transcript; page 29 of Clifford Hales' deposition transcript; 
pages 6, 7, and 9 of Dean Schick's deposition transcript; and pages 21, 22, 24, 33, 34,35, 41, 
42, 43,46,47, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, and 80 of Paul Evans' deposition 
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transcript. (See Smiths "Brief of Appellants" and attachments thereto, including in particular 
Exhibits 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 18, and 19.) 
As to the other approximately 13 deposition pages Smiths have inappropriately attached 
to their Brief, which deposition pages are also not a part of the "Record" on appeal, they are 
the following: pages 10 and 33 of Brent Reynolds' deposition transcript; pages 32,45, and 79 
of Joel Warner's deposition transcript; page 28 of Clifford Hales' deposition transcript; page 
8 of Dean Schick's deposition transcript; and pages 23, 24, 36, 44,45, and 48of Paul Evans' 
deposition transcript. (See Smiths "Brief of Appellants" and attachments thereto, including 
in particular Exhibits 1, 4, 6, 8, and 18.) 
Again, this Court should strike the above referred to deposition pages, (and any new 
issues and arguments Smiths now attempt to raise in their Brief); and Hale & Warner hereby 
request that such be stricken.. 
(2) Appellants Smiths inappropriately refer to and rely on inadmissible 
hearsay, which the trial court also found to be inadmissible hearsay; and 
this court should strike or otherwise disregard such inadmissible 
hearsay. 
As more fully discussed below, Plaintiffs' rely on inadmissible hearsay in support of 
their position as to the acts of Hales & Warner. Hales & Warner objected to such hearsay to 
the trial court, requesting that it be stricken. (See e.g. R. 997-1011). For example, Hales & 
Warner expressly indicated to the trial court: "Brent Reynolds hearsay deposition testimony 
and statements in his letter based upon hearsay should be stricken or otherwise disregarded." 
(See Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Hales & Warner Construction's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 18, R. 1003.) 
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The trial court discussed such hearsay statements during oral argument and found that 
as to Brent Reynolds' deposition testimony and statements made in letters written by Brent 
Reynolds concerning Hales & Warner's actions before the accident, that Brent Reynolds was 
relying on hearsay statements he had heard, and that he was not testifying concerning things of 
which he had actual knowledge. (See Oral Argument Hearing on Motions, R. 1059, pp. 58-59, 
attached hereto as Attachment "7.") The trial court points out that "in the end" Brent Reynolds' 
deposition "turned into pretty minor stuff." (R. 1059, p. 59,11. 19-20.) 
Smiths "Facts" that refer to or are based upon inadmissible hearsay should be stricken 
and/or otherwise disregarded, including Smiths' unnumbered paragraph (in part) three, and 
Smiths' paragraphs "a" through "g" in Plaintiffs' "Statement of the Facts." (See Brief of 
Appellants, pp. 9-12.) 
(3) Appellants Smiths agreed and stipulated to the trial court that there were 
no dispute of facts, and that the instances to which Smiths referred as to 
Hales & Warner's acts were only two minor instances, and Smiths can not 
now attempt to assert otherwise. 
During the second hearing before the trial court, towards the end of Smiths' counsel's 
argument, Smiths' counsel agreed to the trial court that Smiths' position as to Hales & 
Warner's actions (that Smiths' claimed would allegedly establish a duty in Hales & Warner) 
only related to "[1] the height of the one wall, the one inch difference, and then [2] there was 
the, how they were going to build the wall that was supposed to be raked to meet the trusses." 
(R. 1059, p. 58 11. 23-25, p. 59 11. 1-6.) 
Based upon this agreement by Smiths' counsel with the trial court, this Court should 
also strike or otherwise disregard Plaintiffs' assertions that Hales & Warner's prior acts were 
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anything than these two minor instances. 
The point here is that Smiths cannot agree and stipulate to the trial court in oral 
argument that Hales & Warner's prior actions only involved these two minor incidents, and 
then later on appeal change their (Smiths') position. 
Further, this Court should note that this is a stipulation by Smiths' counsel as to the 
facts, which stipulation the trial court refer to in its ruling (R. 1059, p. 75, Attachment "7"), 
and also expressly referred to in its "Order on Summary Judgment." As Utah law indicates, 
stipulations are conclusive and binding upon the party making the stipulation; and stipulations 
made by an attorney may not be disregarded or set aside at will. See e ^ DLB Collection Trust 
v. Hales. 893 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Court App. 1995). 
(4) Further Response to Smiths "Statement of the Facts" in Smiths5 Brief. 
In addition to the above, Hales & Warner will also point out that in Smiths' Briefs' 
"Statement of the Facts" section, Smiths make astoundingly many other inaccurate and 
misleading assertions and/or statements that are not supported by the record and/or deposition 
testimony to which Smiths cite; Smiths also cite to deposition pages that are not a part of the 
record, and which this Court should strike. 
Because of space constrains, and because of the many inaccuracies in Smiths' Facts, 
Hales & Warner requests that this Court review the actual "Record," rather than rely on Smiths' 
inaccurate and misleading assertions pertaining thereto. When the actual "Record"is review, 
it does not support Smiths' position, but supports the trial court's order. 
Hales & Warner will also point out that, (other than the new "facts" not previously cited 
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to by Smiths), most of Smiths "facts" are essentially the same facts (many verbatim) that 
Smiths set forth in Smiths' supplemental memorandum to the trial court. Hales & Warner 
refers his Court to, and incorporates herein, Hales & Warner's response to Smiths' "Facts" 
in Hales & Warner's "Supplemental Reply Memorandum in support of Hales and Warner 
Construction's Motion for Summary Judgment " (R. 997-1011.), as well as the "Reply 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Appellee Hales & Warner's Motion For 
Summary Disposition" (pp. 2-16) filed in this Court, (both of which responses are 
incorporated herein). 
However, before concluding this section, Hales & Warner would like to discuss a 
number of examples of Smiths' inaccurate and misleading assertions in Smiths' "Statement of 
the Facts." For example, Smiths' counsel misrepresents Brent Reynolds' testimony in Smiths' 
paragraph "g;" Smiths assert: 
g. Brent Reynolds could not recall whether there was a single 
aspect of the framing process with which defendant Appellee H & W did 
not interfere. See BRC Depo at 28, attached as exhibit 4, (emphasis 
supplied). 
(See Smiths' Brief, p. 6, holding in original Smiths' Brief.) Smiths use this false "fact" 
to further argue in Smiths Brief that Hales & Warner interfered with Egbert Constructions' 
work. This is a misrepresentation of what was said. It is one thing to say that a person 
does not know one way or the another the extent to which someone had interfered with the 
work of another; it is another thing to try to mis-characterize that testimony to try to 
suggest that Hales & Warner interfered with all aspects of Egbert Constructions' work. 
Mr. Reynolds' deposition testimony actually states that he only had personal knowledge 
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of one thing that occurred (after the accident); and he states "I don't know" (one way or 
another) as to other instances (other than the two other hearsay instances he mentioned). 
As another example, the actual deposition testimony of Reynolds shows the hearsay 
nature of Brent Reynolds letter and deposition testimony, as well as the inaccuracy of 
Smith's "statements" thereto; see Brent Reynolds' testimony on pages 25-30, and 44-47, 
(R. 941-950), as compared to Smiths' unnumbered paragraph (in part) three, and Smiths' 
paragraphs "a" through "g" in Plaintiffs' "Statement of the Facts" (See Brief of Appellants, 
pp. 9-12.). Again, Brent Reynolds' deposition testimony only refers to three separate 
instances as to Hales & Warner alleged action: two of these instances occurred prior to 
the accident and of which Brent Reynolds admitted he had no personal knowledge; and one 
instance which occurred after the accident and of which Brent Reynolds had only partial 
personal knowledge. 
As yet another example, in Smiths' paragraph "q," Smiths cite to deposition 
testimony which is not part of the "record" on appeal, and also which was not referred to 
by Smiths in their memoranda filed with the trial court. Accordingly, Smiths' paragraph 
"q" should be stricken, as well as the deposition pages cited to. Further, as to the second 
sentence in this paragraph, such is inaccurate and misleading as to the deposition 
testimony cited in support of such. Moreover, the deposition testimony refers to the 
conduct of Egbert Construction, Inc.; and nothing in the deposition testimony cited to 
imposes a duty upon Hales & Warner as to the injuries suffered by Jason Smith, even if 
such was considered. 
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Smiths' second sentence in paragraph "q" is without citation, without basis or 
foundation, and was not briefed, let alone fully briefed in the trial court. The next sentence 
in paragraph "q" is also inaccurate, and contrary to the deposition testimony cited. The last 
sentence of Plaintiffs' paragraph "q" is also inaccurate and misleading. 
These are just some of the many and pervasive inaccuracies contained in Smiths' 
"Statement of the Facts." The following (and nearly all) paragraphs in Smiths' "Statement 
of the Facts"are inaccurate and/or unreliable and/or hearsay and/or not part of the 
"Record:" unnumbered paragraphs 1,2,3, and 5; and designated paragraphs a, b, c, d, e, f, 
g, h, i, j , k, 1, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, and t. 
E. Response to Defendant CPB's Statement of Facts 
Appellee Hales & Warner has received and reviewed the Brief of 
Appellee/Defendant CPB. In CPB's Brief, it contains a "Statement of the Case" which 
refers to various provisions to the contract between CPB and Hales & Warner. We will 
pint out that there is no contract between Hales & Warner and Egbert Construction. As 
to the contract between CPB and Hales & Warner, those contract provisions are irrelevant 
as to whether Hales & Warner (the general contractor) owed a duty to the employee 
(Plaintiff Jason Smith) of a sub-subcontractor (Egbert Construction, Inc.) under the 
circumstances of this case. 
However, Hales & Warner will note that the contract between CPB and Hales & 
Warner expressly contemplated the use of subcontractors to perform work thereunder. 
For example, as to the CPB/Hale & Warner contract, the first section of the 
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General Conditions (after the Definitions section) is entitled "Execution, Correlation and 
Intent," and states that the Contract Documents are 
. . . not intended to control the contractor in dividing the work among the 
subcontractors or to establish the extent of the work performed by any 
trade. 
(See "General Conditions," p. 2, R. 267.) The General Conditions of the CPB/Hales & 
Warner contract also state: 
The Contractor shall enter into contracts and Subcontractors to perform 
portions of the Work that the Contractor does not customarily perform with 
its own employees. 
(See "General Conditions," p. 2, R. 267.) Further, as to the CPB/Hales & Warner contract 
and the contemplation of the use of subcontractors, there is an entire section, Section 5, 
relating to subcontractors. (See "General Conditions," pp. 5-6, R. 263-264.) In addition, 
in the "General Provisions," it defines a "subcontractor," stating: 
. . . a subcontractor is any entity supplying labor, materials or equipment for 
the work under separate contract with the contractor or with any other 
subcontractor. 
(See "General Conditions," p. 1, R. 268.) 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I of Hales & Warner's argument section points out that Hales & Warner did 
not owe Jason Smith a duty under the "retained control" exception to the general rule of 
non-liability. Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22 expressly states that the "retained control" 
exception requires that the general contractor (Hales & Warner) exert affirmative control 
over the "the injury-causing aspect" of Jason Smith's work. Hales & Warner did not exert 
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affirmative control over the "injury-causing aspect" of Jason Smith's work. 
Plaintiffs' stipulation that if the standard in Thompson v. Jess, requires Hales & Warner 
to exert affirmative control over the "injury-causing aspect of the work," then Smiths 
"lose." The Thompson \ Jess decision clearly indicates that one mi ist affirmativel} exer I: 
control over the injury-causing aspect of the work for there to be duty. 
In b u m 111 I laics k, Warner pouns oui lhai in the initial oral argument hearing 
before the trial court, Smiths' counsel stipulated that the applicable standard required the 
affirmative exertion of control over "the injury-causing" aspect of the work. (It was not 
ilici \ s - iVtiiisrl had eoniliii kd iicUitioiiiil discos »*r and -.aw lliiii \\c nuiU mil 
meet that standard, that Smiths' counsel changed his position at a second hearing, and 
argued that a broader standard applied.) However, when one combines the stipulation made 
on the record to the trial court in the first hearing, with the stipulation referred to above 
in Point II made to the trial court on the record in the second hearing, it appears that the 
Smiths ha v e stipi llated ,;aw a\ ""  then case. •' - •'- • • 
In Point IV, Hales & Warner points out that Smiths cannot meet their burden of 
establishing that Hales & Warner "breached" any duty claimed to have been owed Jason 
Smith. 
Ti: Point V, Hales & Warner points out that Smiths cannot meet their burden of 
:';•• c i c j i : ; ' ; . .ujviiu'i:, • ;; i iaieb ^ ,\ arncr:: reached a dutythat caused 
Jason Smith's injury.) 
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In Point VI, although Smiths only assert liability against CPB relating thereto, 
Hales & Warner points out that Hales & Warner is not an employee of CPB; rather, Hales 
& Warner is an independent contractor. 
In Point VII, Hales & Warner points out that it has received a copy of Smiths' 
"Reply Brief of the Appellants to the Brief of Appellee CPB," and Hales & Warner points 
out a number of problems pertaining thereto, including the inappropriate raising of new 
issues by Smiths in their reply brief. 
In conclusion, Hales & Warner requests that the court affirm the trial court's 
summary judgment order, and/or otherwise grant judgment in favor of Hales & Warner. 
Hales & Warner also requests an order striking the contents of various documents and new 
issues/arguments inappropriately asserted by Smiths. 
V. ARGUMENT 
1. Hales & Warner Owed No Duty to Jason Smith 
The discussion in this point, (and in points 2, 3, 4, and 5 below), relate to Smiths' 
first "issue" presented for review. 
Smiths have the burden of establishing that Hales & Warner owed Jason Smith a 
"duty" of care under the circumstances of this case. Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 
1360, 1363-1368 (Utah 1986). Further, Smiths' have the burden of establishing the 
"retained control" exception to the general rule of non-liability of general contractors. 
See e.g. Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT. 22, fl 13-26.) Plaintiffs have failed to meet their 
burden of establishing that Hales & Warner owed Plaintiff Jason Smith a duty. 
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Note, as the Utah Supreme Court points out in Thompson v. Jess: 
We note that the term "retained control' doctrine is somewhat of a 
misnomer. Under the standards announced herein, a duty of care is imposed if 
the [general contractor] asserts affirmative control over or actually participates 
actively in the manner of performance of the [subcontracted work. 
'Retained,'to the extent the word implies placidity or non-action, is inapt." 
See l .v ** .: : brackets added). . 
S The Standard Set Forth in Thompson v. Jess as to the "Retained Control" 
Except ion Requires That Hales & Warner Affirmatively Took Control 
Over the "Injury-Causing Aspect" of Jason Smith's Work. 
lii Appellant/Plaintiff Smith ' s Brief, Smiths agree, (as they agreed in the trial court 
below), that Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22 , sets the standard as to the "retained control" 
exception {<) tin: iKiuTa! rim .n'n.Hi ii.ihiiiis, ami » !<> win ;!•• r f] *'•"*< -A •• .IHUT ;V>UN! ! , i... 
Smith a duty. (See Brief of Appellants, p. 19.) However, Smiths go . : their Brief to mis-
state the narrow standard pertaining to the "retained control" exception outlined in Thompson. 
Smiths take a position that if Hales & Warner affirmatively took control over any aspect 
of the framing work, even though it was unrelated to the injury-causing aspect of Jason Smith's 
w ork then I lales & \ v arne t: : • < * e ::i las' :)ii Smith a cli ity as tc • till s Jason Smith 's inji ii: ;; - , 
However , contrary to Smiths ' position, the Utah Supreme Court in Thompson expressly 
states, (multiple t imes and in various ways) , that the "retained control" exception requires the 
exertion t.: .itYiir-...:.* . -. * -ntrol over the method or operative detail of the "injury-causing 
aspect of the work ." Thompson, 1999 U T 22, at Iflj 15-26. 
Because Thompson is miu-i . •
 : • . J . •.;. .i\. c. fhompson w 11 1 be t e * ie v\ eci in 
some detail. In Thompson, Connie Jess was the owner of four motels; and Jess purchased a 
used steel pipe from AmeriKan Sanitation, which pipe "would fit vertically over an existing 
pipe stud" "for use as a sign post." Id- at p . When the pipe was delivered by Dennis Jensen 
and Trevor Thompson, (employees of AmeriKan Sanitation), Jess asked Jensen if he would 
install the pipe. Mr. Jensen agreed to do so, even though he was not equipped to erect it in the 
best manner. The Thompson Court points out: 
. . . Jensen, who had hoisted similar pipes more than a hundred times 
before, determined on his own the manner and method of lifting and installing 
the pipe. . . . 
Id. at If 4 (emphasis added). Thompson was injured during the installation of the pipe, and filed 
suit against Jess. Jess moved for summary judgment, arguing that: 
. . . she did not direct or otherwise control the manner or method of 
installing the pipe, and therefore owed no duty of care to Thompson or Jensen 
to insure they raised the pipe safely . . . . 
Id. at Tf 7 (emphasis added). In Thompson, the Court went on to point out: 
. . . Thompson argues that by requesting that he and Jensen erect the pipe 
when they were not obligated to do so, and by directing them to install the pipe 
over the existing pipe stub, Jess asserted control over the work and thereby 
assumed a duty of care to him to him under the "retained control" doctrine . . . 
Id. at f 8. (The Thompson Court found that these requests and direction did not impose a duty.) 
The "Analysis" section of the Thompson decision begins by setting forth the general 
rule, stating: 
Utah adheres to the general common law rule that "the employer of an 
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an 
act or omission of the contractor or his servants." Restatement § 409; see 
Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 16, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (1937) (noting 
applicability of said general rule and certain exceptions to it). This general rule 
recognizes that one who hires an independent contractor and does not participate 
in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed owes no 
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duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of performance 
implemented. See W. Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 409 (5th ed. 
1984). The most commonly accepted reason for this rule is that, where the 
principal employer does not control the means of accomplishing the contracted 
work, the contractor "is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility 
for preventing the risk, and administering and distributing it." Id 
Id. i H | f 13 
As the Utah Supreme Court indicates in Thompson, this rule of nonliability also 
applies to situations where a general contractor hires a subcontractor. (See e.g. id- at fTf 
""-•" is, 1 hompson sets the standard to be applied as to "\ v hether a general contractor 
(here Hales & Warner) owes a duty to an employee of a sub-subcontractor (here Jason 
Smith). 
i lis,, rhompsoii. Coin t goes on t : indicate that there . ertain exceptions t :: the 
general rule of nonliability," including the "retained control" doctrine. Id. at J^ 13. The 
Court points out in Thompson that the "retained control" exception is a "narrow theory of 
liability" :r^n h «> •- * u-.i^uk r * -^ . - r .^ r r . - -< . --actor) 
of an independent contractor (or subcontractor) exercises enough control "to give rise to 
a hi-i/^j JLI!\ oi cu:v LC. a. " .5. 
As to the "retained control" exception, the Thompson Court went on to adopt the 
standard that a principal retaining an independent contractor has no duty to the employees 
states that "elaboration on the contours of the standard is needed, however." Id. at f 18 
(emphasis added.). 
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In setting forth the contours of this standard, the Thompson Court expressly 
indicates on multiple occasions that the exertion of control must be over the injury-
causing aspect of the work: and in this review below of the Thompson Court's elaboration 
of this standard, we underline some of these phrases indicating that the control has to be 
related to the part of the work that caused the injury. 
Immediately after indicating that elaboration on the contours of the standard is 
needed, the Thompson Court states: 
Under the "active participation" standard, a principal employer is 
subject to liability for injuries arising out of its independent contractor's 
work if the employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over, the 
manner of performance of the contracted work. S^ ee Conklin v. Cohen, 287 
So. 2d 56,60 (Fla. 1973) (holding that under "active participation" standard, 
principal employer must directly influence manner in which work is 
performed; no duty arises from "passive nonparticipation"). Such an 
assertion of control occurs, for example, when the principal employer 
directs that the contracted work be done by use of a certain mode or 
otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which the work is to be 
accomplished. See, e.g., Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc. 170 Ariz. 
384, 825 P.2d 5,7-8 (Ariz. 1992) (imposing liability where subcontractor's 
employee was injured as result of new, less safe method of work required 
by general contractor); Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S. W.2d 415,418 (Tex. 
1985) (imposing liability where subcontractor was ordered to operate 
backhoe dangerously close to plaintiff). 
Id. at Tf 19 (underlining added). 
This Court will note that the above quoted language in Thompson includes cases 
addressing whether a duty was owed by a general contractor to an injured employee of the 
subcontractor. Id. The Thompson Court goes on to state: 
. . . In other words, to have "actively participated" in the contracted 
work, a principal employer must have exercised affirmative control over the 
method or operative detail of that work. The degree of control necessary for 
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the creation of a legal duty must involve either the direct management of the 
means and methods of the independent contractor's activities or the 
provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury." 
. . . [ I]he principal employer must exert such control over the means 
utilized that the contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of the 
work in his or her own way. 
language indicating that the control has to be over the "injury-causing aspect of the work;" 
and such only makes sense for vark^. . bvious reasons. Among other things, causation 
(oi Hi; ;-. :.'..! • * negligent heh-'-ior has always been a key element to negligence 
claims. 
,
 n c ifaQ mpS o n Court goes on to uiscuss a ca.sc u1 iuusiralcr Hie roquisiic ic\ ei t,»i 
control over the contractor's work;" and this Court will note that this illustrative case 
involves a general contractor and an injured employee of a subcontractor. The Thompson 
< nun slates: 
The requisite level of control over the contractor's work is well 
illustrated in Lewis, 825 P.2d at 7-8. There, the general contractor, Riebe, 
hired the subcontractor, Garges, to install a pitched roof constructed of 
beams and sheets of plywood nailed to the beams. After Garges had already 
put the plywood in place, Riebe's on-site superintendent told Garges the 
roof was improperly installed and ordered it redone, specifying the use of 
H-clips to secure the plywood. Pursuant to this instruction, Garges 
employees began removing the nails from each row of plywood, installing 
H-clips, and then renailing the plywood to the beams. Soon thereafter, 
however, Riebe's superintendent instructed the Garges employees to use a 
different, faster method of dislodging the plywood by banging it from 
underneath. Because this method resulted in plywood being dislodged 
faster than H-clips could be installed, numerous sheets of plywood were 
left lying loose on top of the beams. A Garges employee stepped on the 
loose plywood and feel through the roof, incurring serious injuries. See M. 
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Thus, in Lewis, the general contractor interfered with the 
subcontractor's method of performing the work and instructed that a 
quicker but less safe method be implemented. A worker was injured as a 
direct result of the dangerous condition created by the general contractor's 
method. The court concluded, on the basis of these facts, that the general 
contractor exercised sufficient control over the means used in performing 
the contracted work to subject it to retained control liability. See 825 P.2d 
at 14-15. 
Id. at ff 22, 23, (underlining added). Again, this Court will note the language indicating 
that the injury was "a direct result" of the dangerous condition created by the control 
exerted by the general contractor. Thus, the Thompson Court's discussion of the Lewis 
case illustrates, and expressly states, the necessary causal link between the control exerted 
by the general contractor and the injury. 
It is also important to note, as indicated in the Thompson Court's discussion of 
Lewis, that the Utah Supreme Court did not state that general contractor Riebe was liable 
merely because he had entered into a subcontract with a subcontractor (Garges) to do the 
framing work on that project. Further, in its discussion of Lewis, the Utah Supreme Court 
did not state that general contractor Reibe was liable merely because general contractor 
Reibe had an on-site superintendent. 
Moreover, the Thompson Courts discussion of Lewis indicates that the general 
contractor was not liable due to the general contractor's on-site superintendent's first 
action of telling the subcontractor "Garges the roof was improperly installed and 
order[ing] it redone, specifying the use of H-clips to secure the plywood." Id. at ^  22. The 
Thompson Court's discussion of Lewis indicates that the general contractor only became 
liable due to the second and "thereafter" action by general contractor "Reibe's 
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superintendent instuct[ing] the Garges employees to use a different" and "quicker but less 
of the dangerous condition created by the general contractor's method;" and it was only 
those additional facts, (i.e. of the general contractor's exertion of affirmative control and 
method), that subjected the general contractor to liability Id. at Tflj 22, 23 (brackets 
added). 
In concluding its analysis on the "retain control" exception, the Thompson Court 
applies the facts of that case to the standard enunciated, stating: 
Applying these standards to the case at hand, we conclude that Jess 
did not actively participate in the manner in which Thompson and Jensen 
attempted to lift and install the steel pipe. After agreeing to erect the pipe, 
Jensen, not Jess, determined the method for bringing about the desired 
result. . . . Thompson's injury was caused by the manner of performance, 
implemented by Jensen, over which Jess exercised no direction, control or 
supervision. . , . 
Thus, because Jess did not actively participate in or otherwise 
exercise affirmative control over the manner or method of performance 
utilized by Jensen and Thompson, she owed Thompson no duty of care under 
the retained control doctrine. 
Id. at THf 24, 25. 
-n1- -• ->;!•>•• > • ^ Ihompsoii v * r-.. *. .; ;.. •v^-;hN;- M:^;:;*: 
the exerted control has to be over the injury causing aspect of the work in order for there 
to be liability. If a general contractor exerts control over another aspect of the work that 
did not cause injury , bi it did not exert control o\ e r the aspect of the vv ork th<: it did cai lse 
30 
injury, there is no liability. 
For an example of the "narrowness" of the "retained control" standard and it being 
"confined in scope to the control asserted," (id. at ^ 15), even assuming Hales & Warner 
had asserted control over one aspect of the lifting of the wall involved in the accident, and 
also assuming that this one aspect over which Hales & Warner asserted affirmative control 
did not cause Jason Smith's injury, there would be no duty under Thompson. 
Turning to the facts, the undisputed facts show that Hales & Warner did not exert 
affirmative control over the injury-causing aspect of Jason Smith's work, (even assuming 
that it was the method by which he and the other Egbert employees were placing the wall 
onto the bolts which caused injury).l Thus, under the standard enunciated and elaborated 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Thompson, Hales & Warner owed no duty to Jason Smith, 
and the trial court order of summary judgment should be affirmed.. 
B. In Order for Hales & Warner to Owe a Duty, the Thompson "Retained 
Control" Standard Requires that Smiths Establish the Affirmative 
Exertion of the Degree of "Control" to the Extent that the 
Subcontractor is Prohibited from Doing the Work the 
Subcontractor's Own Way. 
In the discussion above of Thompson, particular focus has been given to the 
language therein requiring that the affirmative exertion of control be over the "injury-
causing aspect of the work." In this subsection, we would like to focus on the language in 
the Thompson Court discussing the degree of affirmative "control" that must be exerted 
'Note, there is no evidence that the (Egbert Construction) method by which they (i.e. Jason 
Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis), were placing the wall on the foundation bolts was an unsafe 
method. 
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in order to impose a duty (on Hales & Warner). In discussing the "retained control" 
exceptioi 1 to the general i: i lie of nonliability tl le I hompson Court expressly states as to 
the degree of control required, that the general contractor "must exert such control over 
the means utilized that the [sub]contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of 
the work in his or her own vv av." I d at f 21 (emphasis added). 
As indicated above, the Utah Supreme Court illustrated the requisite level of 
coiiti ol o v ei the subcontractor' s \ v ork \ hich is required in disci issing the Lewis case Id 
at |^ f 22, 23. The Thompson Court points out that it was not enough that the general 
contractor, after noticing that the roof had been improperly installed, ordered it to be 
control over the subcontractor employees "and instructed that a quicker but lesser method 
be implemented." Id- at ^ 22, 23 (emphasis added). The court refers to "the dangerous 
condition created bv the general contractor's method." The Thompson Court points out 
that the Lewis court concluded, "on the basis of these facts, that the general contractor 
exercised sufficient control over the means used ....... v n. ... 
subject it to retain control liability." Id. at f 23. 
' I he Thompson Court also points out as to the control asserted, that for an 
i mposition of a cii it; ' : 
, , , i is not enough that he [the general contractor] has merely a 
general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress 
or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need 
not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. 
Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean 
that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to 
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operative detail." 
Id. at f^ 20 (underlining added). 
In summary, not only must there be an affirmative exertion of control by the 
general contractor over the injury-causing aspect of Jason Smith's work, that exertion of 
control must be to the degree that Jason Smith could not "carry out the injury-causing 
aspect of the work in his or her own way." Id. at ^  21. Here, as Smiths admit, there is no 
evidence that Hales & Warner affirmatively took control over the method of the work 
being performed by Jason Smith at the time of the accident, (i.e. placing the wall onto the 
bolts), prohibited Jason Smith (or Egbert Construction) from using their own method as 
to the placement of that wall onto the bolt, and required Jason Smith (and Egbert 
Construction) to use a different, less safe, and dangerous method. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Hales & Warner owed a duty 
to Jason Smith. In particular, and among other things, Plaintiffs have failed to establish 
that (1) Hales & Warner affirmatively exerted the required degree of "control" and (2) 
that the control was over "the injury-causing aspect" of the work of Jason Smith. 
As a more extreme example to highlight the point being made here, Hales & 
Warner would owe no duty even assuming (for argument purposes) that Hales & Warner 
had only "recommended," but had not "required," that Egbert Construction instruct Jason 
Smith to place the subject wall onto the foundation stud bolts by using an unsafe method, 
and that unsafe method caused Jason Smith's injury; (although such action by Hales & 
Warner did not actually occur). 
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Moreover, not only is Smiths' position directly contrary to the policy enunciated 
in i hompson (of charging the responsibility foi pre^ anting risk to the person in acti lal 
control), Plaintiffs' position is also contrar) to other policies, including policies 
underlying the Utah comparative fault scheme, (and only being held responsible for one's 
• • J , - ' * i- • • .» f a i r n e s s . A^> r v o \ J : \ th- : :v-h ' -. i.- • * " • * ' * * i v c 
implications of Smiths' position are significant and far-reaching. 
v\ c w in point out that as tc its ruling, the trial coin: t judge thoroughly re v ie vv ed the 
factual record (including the cited deposition testimony), and the law, including in 
particular the Thompson case. (R. 1058, p. 5,11. 8-10, R. 105°. n. 6.11. 19-24, p. 75/> In 
and re-read Thompson, before issuing its ruling. (R. 1059, p. 74,11. 22-25, p. 75 1. 1. i The 
court then gave a thorough and detailed ruling covering approximately 18 pages. (K. i J: v. 
pp. 75 92 ) • • . - . 
Judge Laycock states in her ruling, among many other things: 
I think the testimony in the depositions makes it clear that those 
three employees [Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis] were never 
under the direction of Maurice Egbert who was the superintendent for Hales 
and Warner. They were under the supervision, the instruction and the 
direction of Ken Egbert. That was the person that Michael Lewis said 
showed him how to put up a wall, how to build a wall, a, down on the, the 
ground level... before it was put up. There [sic] was Ken Egbert that gave 
him his education on the job . . . . 
I have no facts before me that persuade me that Maurice Egbert ever 
interfered with, in any way, the way in which Egbert Construction did its 
work under the Thompson case. 
And particularly with reference to the, the wall that was being 
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constructed on the date of the plaintiffs death. That wall was supervised by 
Ken Egbert and apparently a man named Manny. And it was after lunch that 
Manny instructed these three men including the plaintiff to put that wall up. 
Maurice Egbert was in the trailer at the time and had no involvement in that 
wall. 
(R. 1059, pp. 77-79.) 
(i) The CPB/Hales & Warner Contract 
Smiths assert in their second issue on appeal that CPB (not Hales & Warner) owed 
a duty to Jason Smith due to the terms of the CPB/Hales & Warner contract. However, 
Hales and Warner will make a number of points relating thereto. 
First, there is no contract between Hale & Warner and Egbert Construction. 
Second, although such is irrelevant as to Hales & Warner because Hales & Warner 
did not have a contract with Egbert Construction, the Thompson Court states that contract 
rights to "order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, 
to make suggestions or recommendations" "or to prescribe alterations and deviations" 
"does not mean that the [sub] contractor is controlled as to his methods of work or as to 
operative detail." Id. at % 20. 
Moreover, even though the CPB contract is irrelevant as to Hales & Warner's 
relationship with Jason Smith and Egbert Construction, we will note that the trial court 
pointed out in her ruling, after citing the Thompson language referred to immediately 
above: 
And so all of those things that were listed by plaintiff in the memo 
a, coming out of the contract I find do not change the status of Hales and 
Warner as an independent contractor, and they also do not become the 
equivalent of retaining control.. . . 
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(R. 1059, p.84,11. 22 - 25, p. 85, p. 86/11 1-7.) 
. •• :r • 'se Hooker v. Department o; 1 ransportaiion, 
38 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 2002) supports summary judgment in Hales & Warner's favor. Noie. 
the California Supreme Court referred to and quoted from upreme C-ui: 
decision of Thompson. I he Hooker Court states: 
Under Kinney, . . . mere retention of the ability to control safety 
conditions is not enough." [A] general contractor owes no duty of care to an 
employee of a subcontractor to prevent or correct unsafe procedures or 
practices to which the contractor did not contribute by direction, induced 
reliance, or other affirmative conduct. The mere failure to exercise a power 
to compel the subcontractor to adopt safer procedures does not, without 
more, violate any duty owed to the plaintiff. . . 
I he Kinney court, we conclude, ci"-' ••"• - . - . of oi u 
decisions in Privette and Toland. . . . 
Id. at 1087-1088. In Hooker, the court went on to discuss Kenney, stating: 
Ihe question, as the Kinney court framed it, was "whether a general 
contractor who claims the power to control all safety procedures on the 
worksite may be liable to the injured employee of a subcontractor for 
failing to direct the subcontractor to take safety precautions where there is 
no evidence that any conduct by the general contractor contributed 
affirmatively to the injuries." (Kinney, supra, 87 Cal. App.4th at p. 30.) 
Kinney answered that question in the negative. 
Id. Thus, and lastly as to this sub-subpoint, based upon the authority above, contract 
pro1' ' isions (regardless of their cont snt), io not impose such a duty; oi il;> 1:1: le exertion of 
affirmative control (over the injury causing aspect of the work) imposes a duty. 
r
 Even Under Appellants/Plaintiffs Smith Erroneously Asserted 
Standard, There Still Would Be No Liability Because Hales & Warner 
Did Not Affirmatively Exert Control Over the Non-Injury Related 
Aspects of Jason Smith's Work. 
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Although the Thompson standard requires affirmative exertion of control over the 
injury causing aspect of the work, Hales & Warner will point out that Hales & Warner 
would still prevail even under the standard erroneously asserted by Smiths. Even if, as 
Smiths assert, the standard only required affirmative exertion of control over a non-
related and non-injury causing aspect of the means utilized in the work of Jason Smith (or 
Egbert Construction), there would still be no liability imposed upon Hales & Warner 
herein. 
Even under the erroneous standard asserted by Smiths, the general contractor must 
still exert such control over the "non-injury" methods utilized that the subcontractor 
cannot carry out that part of the work in the subcontractors own way. In addition, the 
Thomspon Court states that it is not enough that the general contractor has general rights 
to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to 
make suggestions or recommendations, or to prescribe alterations and deviations; and the 
Utah Supreme Court further states that such rights "does not mean that the [sub]contractor 
is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail." Id. at ^ | 20. 
In this case at bar, Smiths cannot meet their own erroneous standard. The two 
referenced instances as to Hales & Warner actions do not rise to the required level of 
control, (let alone cause injury). For example, as to the first instance, instructing Egbert 
Construction to "comply with the plans" as to the height of a wall is not even exerting 
control over the method utilized, let alone exerting sufficient control. As to the second 
instance, merely recommending that studs above the top plate not be cut until a later time 
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is not taking control, let a lone affirmatively exerting the required and sufficient control 
I 1 hompson) * »-• :;*»w*:' * • • ' 
W e will here also address a number of Smiths ' other meri t less arguments. In 
Smiths ' Brief, Smiths discuss a number of cases from other courts as though they are 
controlling over the Utah Supreme Cour t ' s own "elaboration on the contours of the 
standard" in Thompson. Smiths refer to and discuss at some length Simon v. Deerv O i l 
0vs i • , , • M. >ewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 2 ) 4 {1C ' 1 : 1 
1979), Texaco, Inc v. Pruitt 396 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1968), and Erwin v. Kern River Gas 
Transmission Co., 1997 WL 804238. While the Thompson Court initially cites to these 
cases Ihompson • -
immediately thereafter states that: "Elaboration of the contours of the standard is needed, 
however." Id. at ^ 18 (emphasis added). Ihe fhompson Court then goes on to elaborate 
the contours of the standard in its paragraphs 19 through 24, which paragraphs Hales & 
Warner has discussed above in detail and at length. 
'
f> 1 hompson • v xiu.v, 
general contractor "must exert such control over the mean utilized that the [sub] contractor 
cannot carry out the injury causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." Id. at Tf 21 
(brackets added). 
The standard elaborated in Thompson is the controlling standard, not any standard 
• : • t i nterpretation set fc i th in Simon, Sewell, Texaco, or Erwin, \ -*..x t.><. ? . i- u standards 
in those other cases are in any way different than the standard elaborated in Thompson; and 
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Smiths' assertions otherwise are meritless and inaccurate. 
Moreover, while page limitation does not allow for a more detailed discussion of 
such, certain assertions made by Smiths' counsel as to those other cases are not 
completely accurate. For example, contrary to Smiths' counsel's assertions otherwise, 
Erwin expressly states that the injury must be caused by the act of performance (or 
exertion) over which the general contractor exercised control. See Erwin, 1977 Tex. App. 
Lexis 6685, at *9, *21. In any event, nothing in those cases, (even if Thompson did not 
set forth the standard), preclude summary judgment in Hales & Warner's favor. 
In Smiths' Brief, Smiths' inaccurately assert that the Thompson Court' s "elaboration 
on the contours of the standard" ends after paragraph 19 of the Thompson decision. A 
simple reading of the Thompson case indicates that this assertion by Smiths is false; and 
the Court's elaboration goes on to paragraph 24. In fact, Smiths' counsel took the same 
position with the trial court; and during oral argument the trial court was critical of Smiths' 
assertion, and disagreed with such. (See R. 1059, p. 55.) In the trial court's ruling, the 
Court also referred to the fallacy of Plaintiffs' argument. (See R. 1059, p. 89,11. 9-25, p. 
90,11. 1-2.) 
Moreover, as to Smiths' discussion of other "authorities," to the extent that they 
are in any way consistent with the actual standard set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Thompson, they are inapplicable. 
2. This Court Should Affirm the Trial Court Based Upon Plaintiffs' 
Stipulation That If the Standard in Thompson v. Jess Requires That 
Hales & Warner Exerts Affirmative Control Over the "Injury Causing 
Aspect of the Work/' Then Smiths "Lose." 
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During the second oral argument hearing, Smiths' counsel represented to the court 
"injury causing aspect of the work," "then we [Smiths] lose" on the Appellees' motions for 
summary judgment, i <. p. -o . , . < _-_:. p. v,., . . 1-6, attached hereto as Attachment 
"7," brackets added.) The trial court referenced Smiths' counsel's representation in the 
trial court's Summary Judgment Order; the Summary Judgment Order states: 
rhe Court notes that Plaintiffs' [Smiths'] counsel stipulated on the 
record in oral argument that if the standard for the "retained control" 
exception (to the general rule) set forth in Thompson relates to the "injury-
causing aspect of the work," that Plaintiffs cannot meet the "retained 
control" exception, and that Defendants Hales & Warner's and the CPB's 
motions for summary judgment should be granted. 
Vx^ . xUJ8, Attachment " 1 , " brackets added.) 
As discussed above, the Thompson Court expressly states as to the "retained 
.^-
 r
 • * -^ \ ^ i j < ^ * * rr- I;:-M: exertion of control has t : 1: e : < e i ' '"the iniur\ 
causing aspect of the work." Thompson, 1999 UT 22, at ^[ 20, 21. Thus, based upon 
Smiths' counsel's stipulation, and areading of the Thompson case, this court should affirm 
the trial court's ruling. 
Note, this stipulation is a stipulation by Smiths' counsel as to facts. As this court 
has st'Mc: . ,,,L i.;*. 
(unless good cause is shown for relief); and stipulations made by an attorney may not he 
disregarded or set aside at will. See e,g. DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 8 So I'.Ju : vJ. 
595 (Utah Ct. App 1995). 
A party, through their attorney, is not allowed to make such a stipulation to the trial 
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court, particularly where the trial court may have relied, at least in part, on that stipulation 
in making its decision, and then on appeal take a different position. 
While we have addressed the facts above that show Hales & Warner did not exert 
control over the injury-causing aspect of the work, the point here is that this court need 
not even review the facts based upon Plaintiffs' stipulation to the trial court. The only 
thing this court needs to review is the Thompson case; and if this court agrees with Hales 
& Warner that the Thompson case requires affirmative exertion of control over "the 
injury-causing aspect" of the work, this court should affirm the trial court's order on that 
basis alone. 
3. Appellant/Plaintiffs Smiths Stipulated in the First Hearing that for 
there to be a duty the Standard Required Affirmative Exertion of 
Control Over "the Injury-Causing: Aspect" of the Work, 
At the initial oral argument hearing, Smiths' counsel agreed with Hale & Warner's 
position that the Thompson standard does require the exertion of control oyer "the injury 
causing aspect of the work." For example, at the initial oral argument hearing, Smiths' 
counsel stated: 
I'll agree with Mr. Davenport that if he has one paragraph in one 
affidavit that goes to the narrow issue at hand he's entitled to, his client is 
entitled to summary judgment.... 
. . . And I don't see how those facts will help this Court determine 
that not one or more of the defendants did not exercise affirmative control 
over the manner, method and means of the injury causing aspect of the 
work. . . . 
(See R. 1058, Attachment "8," p.30, 11. 16-25, p. 31, 11. 1-2, underlining added.) For 
another example, Smiths' counsel also stated in the initial oral argument hearing: 
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THE JUDGE: Tell me what you think you're going to find in your 
discovery, or that you should find in your discovery that's going to get you 
past the case law 
MR. BADARUDDIN: Well, the case law doesn't say you can't sue 
a general, well, it doesn't say you can't recover against a general contractor 
or an owner. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
]\1R. BADARUDDIN: It says if the general contractor actively 
participates or exercises control over the means, method, manner of 
accident causing injury, accident causing work, the plaintiff can recover. 
Those, those are the sort of facts we hope to establish... . 
(See R. 1058, Attachment "8," p. 37.11. 10-22, underlining added.) 
"; . .v Sinilhi n funnel agtccil and icpresealal lu llu hi,J omit m lla In si lummy 
that the "retained control" standard did relate to the (exertion of control over the) "injury 
causing aspect of the work." At the initial hearing, Smiths were seeking additional time 
to condi ict fi n ther disco\ er\ A fter additional disco v en w as sondi icted. 'vv hicli discos • eiy 
showed that Hale & Warner did nut exert affirmative control over the injury-causing 
aspect of J ason Smith' s "\ v orl c, Smiths changed their position as to what the "retained 
control" standard is (in Thompson). 
It appears that one has to conclude that Smiths' counsel has agreed or stipulated 
the first hearing that the "retained control" standard relates to the (exertion of control over 
the) "injury-causing aspect of the work." and {. .-.,:;,;:, counsel's representation 
(stipulation) to the court in the second hearing that Smiths' "lose" if the retains. 
standard relates to the (exertion of control over the) "injury-causing aspect of the work." 
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On this separate basis, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
In Smiths' "Appellant's Memorandum in Response to Opposing Appellee's Motion 
for Summary Deposition'Tiled with this appellate court, Smiths admit that counsel can 
stipulate to facts. As discussed above, the second stipulation made by Smiths' counsel 
during the second oral argument was a stipulation as to the facts. 
As to the other stipulation made by Smiths' counsel in the first oral argument, in 
Smiths' "Appellant's Memorandum in Response to Opposing Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Deposition," Smiths cite to the dissenting opinion of Associate Chief Justice 
Russon in Rivera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2000 Utah 36. 
However, Justice Russon points out in that dissenting opinion that: "Parties can stipulate 
to facts, and such stipulations are generally binding on the court. Parties can sometimes 
even stipulate as to conclusions of law, such as liability." Id. at |^ 27 (citation omitted, 
emphasis added). 
Note also that Justice Russon, in his dissent, indicates that the stipulated statement 
involved therein related to the legal effect of the stipulation; and if such is the case, the 
majority in Rivera upheld the stipulation even though it related to the legal effect of the 
stipulated facts. 
Thus, Smiths have apparently stipulated away their case. 
4. Smiths Have Failed to Meet, and Cannot Meet Their Burden of 
Establishing that Hales & Warner "Breached" a Duty Owed to Jason 
Smith 
Smiths not only have the burden of establishing that Hales & Warner owed Jason 
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Smith a duty, Plaintiffs also have the burden of establishing "a breach of that duty." See 
v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).) 
Smiths have not, and cannot, meet their burden of establishing that Haic^ OL W arner 
"breached" a duty owed to Jason Smith. This issue was briefed and argued to the trial 
court below (See R. 991-992, and R. 1059, pp. 24-25, 72-74.) 
'VV eha\ e discussed abo >»/ e the fact that Smiths can note v en establish that a di ity , ' as 
owed. However, this Court should not overlook the fact that Smiths also cannot establish 
the elements of "breach" (and "causation"). As the TTtah Supreme Court indicates in 
Ihompspr.. .. • ' ; '- ' "• *• r- '• ! •- :i;itions ^ "i"/ of reasonable 
care under the circumstances and is confined in scope to the control asserted." 
Thompson, lUoi« « - _ . * . . . 
Normally, if Appellants/Plaintiffs Smiths were able to show that a duty existed, the 
next requirement would be for Smiths to show that it was breached. Plaintiffs have not 
element, the Thompson Court refers to the Lewis case, where the general contractor not 
onl> affirmatively took control (of the method being utilized by the subcontractor), but 
required that a "quicker" and "unsafe" method be implemented, which "created" a 
"dangerous condition." Id at f 22. 
I liiis, a s the Thompson v • , . . - . * ! 
a duty, but the Smiths must establish that there was a breach of that duty after the exertion 
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of control where Hales & Warner required the subcontractor or its employee to 
implement a "less safe method,"creating a dangerous condition. Plaintiffs have not, and 
cannot, show such a breach. 
Now, although there is no evidence that it was the manner in which the subj ect wall 
was placed on the bolts which caused Jason Smith's injury, for the purposes of illustration 
here, we will assume that it was the manner in which Jason Smith placed the subject wall 
accident onto the bolts which caused his injury. 
Under this assumption, not only would Smiths be required to show that Hales & 
Warner exerted control over the method utilized to place the subject wall onto the bolts, 
Smiths would also have to prove that Hales & Warner instructed that an unreasonable, 
unsafe, and dangerous method be used. In other words, even under this assumed 
hypothetical if Hales & Warner took control over this aspect of the work, but instructed 
Jason Smith and the others assisting him to use a safe method, there would be no liability. 
The trial court stated as to this issue: 
Well, I think the way that I've approached it where I found that 
there's actually been no duty it leaves me having to say hypothetically if 
there had been a duty then I don't have any facts to support a breach. 
(See R. 1059, p. 91,11. 11-14, Attachment "7.") 
The trial Judge goes on to state that she "will hang my hat, on the finding that 
there's no duty of care on the part of these two defendants and leave it at that." (See R. 
1059, 11. 11-19.) While the trial court decided not to reach a decision on the "breach" 
issue under the circumstances, it is still Hales & Warner's position that Plaintiffs have 
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not, and cannot, meet their burden of establishing breach, and that such is another valid 
that this Court rule in Hales & Warner's favor on this point. 
5. Smiths Have Not, and Cannot, Meet Their Burden 
of Showing "Causation." 
Smiths also have the burden of establishing that Hales & Warner breach of a duty 
owed Jason Smith "caus[ed], both actually and proximately," injury to Jason Smith. See 
Weber \ . Soring hL LiV*. -•" ;-<.-*- aing _v\jjjuuns 
v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). 
Smiths have not, and cannot, meet their burden of showing that a breach of a duty 
owed to Plaintiff "caused, both actually and proximately," injury to Jason Smith. (This 
issue was also briefed and argued at the trial court level. (See R. 990-991, and R. 1059, 
I >p. 2f 29.) 
In the Thompson Court's initial citation to Lewis v. N. J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 
the Court pointed out that Lewis case was a case "imposing liability where subcontractor's 
en iplo> ee w as iiiji ire d as a result PT • v ^ - *• • ^ r <— • • •• •• • 
general contractor." See Thompson, 1979 UT 2 2 , f 19. Attachment "9." 
t \,s to the facts of this case, the " " :aiise' " of J ason Smith' 's injury could have been 
Jason Smith: merely failing to follow an appropriate method; otherwise acting (himself) 
inappropriately; etc. Moreover, there is no evidence that negligence of Hales & Warner 
"caused" * - \\ cfx,
 x, 
Springville Citv, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986V 
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. . . A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter 
remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at 
best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for 
the defendant. 
Id. at 1367-68 (part of emphasis in original and part of emphasis added). 
Here, there isn't even a possibility of causation (as to Hales & Warner). 
As noted above, the trial court decided not to reach this issue because she found 
that there was no duty. However, again, we believe that this separate basis is a valid basis 
supporting judgment in favor of Hales & Warner, and request judgment of this basis also. 
6. Hales & Warner Was An Independant Contractor, 
and Was Not An Employee of CPB 
In Smiths' Brief, Smiths assert as their third and last issue on appeal: 
3. Whether the relationship of principle employer and independent 
contractor can exist when the principle employer possesses the right to accept 
or reject any subcontractor or employee selected by the purported independent 
contractor. 
(Brief of Appellants, p. 6.) Smiths argue in there Brief that because "CPB had the authority 
to hire and fire employees and subcontractors of Appellee H & W," Hales & Warner was the 
employee of CPB and not an independent contractor. (Brief of Appellants, p. 46.) 
Smiths' arguments are meritless and fail for a number of reasons. First, contrary to 
Smiths' inaccurate assertions otherwise, the CPB/Hales & Warner contract does not give 
CPB the right to hire or fire Hales & Warner's employees (or anyone else's employees); and 
the contract provisions cited by Smiths' do not state such. (See R. 262-263, Sections 
5.1(A),(B), 6.1(A).) Further, Smiths' assertions as to the contract language pertaining to 
subcontractors is not entirely accurate, and the cited provisions do not state that CPB can 
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"fire" subcontractors once they are contracted with. 
Note In an;; • ? rent e\ e n if Smiths' assertions were acci urate w hichthe> are ri, ;::>t si i : l i 
would not make Hales & Warner an employee of CPB, as more fully discussed in the parts 
of ihe Brief oi Appellee . - rw\er:... . .-.. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allow a party to "adopt by reference 
any part of the brief of another." Utah R. App. P. 24(h). In the interests of brevity, Hales & 
the Brief of Appellee CPB. 
A. v_ /!:> ;. dicates immediately after that discussion - - tan ia>, on this point: 
"If we look at the factors, mentioned above, such as control over the day to day 
work, as opposed to merely influencing the result to be achieved, the method 
of payment, that is, wages v. payment for a completed project, the furnishing 
of equipment, etc. The relationship between the CPB and Hales & Warner was 
clearly that of the owner and independent contractor, not employer/employee. 
In sum, Hales & Warner was not the employee of CPB. 
However, even if Hales & Warner was the employee of CPB, which it wasn't, such 
• '^ " lal "is & Wai rr 'zr (c r CI *B) tc Smiths; Smiths v • : n ill :!! still 
have the burden of showing: (1) a duty owed to Jason Smith by Hales & Warner; (2) breach 
c f tliii::: it cliit; < ; arid (3) causation, I: • : th actuall} and proximately, of the injury. As discussed 
above, Smiths have not, and can not, meet their burden in showing any of these three essential 
elements, (let alone all of them). 
7. Reply Brief of the Appellants to the Brief of Appellee C P B . 
Appellee Hales & Warner has received the "Reply Brief of the Appellants to the Brief 
of Appellee CPB. While Hales & Warner does not have adequate space to fully address such, 
Hales & Warner would like to point out that in Smiths' reply brief, Smith have improperly 
raised several new issues/arguments including: the argument that Brent Reynolds was an 
employee of CPB; the argument that Egbert Construction was an employee of CPB; the 
argument that CPB, as a landowner, retained control over Hales & Warner, Brent Reynolds 
Construction and Egbert Construction, and failed to take reasonable care to protect the 
employees of the contractors; the arguments that CPB could be liable under the "peculiar 
risk" or "inherently dangerous work" doctrines; and the argument that CPB is liable because 
it failed to warn Jason Smith of hazards present on the land. 
Further, as to the cases and authority cited by Appellees in their reply brief, Appellees 
have in some instances misinterpreted the law and/or have failed to address the findings of the 
respective courts in full. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that Restatement (Second) of Torts §§413,416 and 427 
apply in this case. Their argument is clearly erroneous, and against well established Utah law. 
Those Restatements deal with the "peculiar risk" or "inherently dangerous work" doctrines. 
The Thompson Court found that these doctrines does not apply in cases where an injured 
person is an employee of an independent contractor, such as in this case; rather the "peculiar 
risk" or "inherently dangerous work" doctrine only applies to innocent "third parties." 
Thompson. 1999 UT 22, at 1130-3 h P. 329. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the discussion above, Hales & Warner requests that the court affirm the 
49 
trial court summary judgment order, (or otherwise enter judgment in favor of Hales & 
Warner and against Smiths). 
In addition, Hales & Warner requests that the court grant Hales & Warner's 
:cqu^L' i' -•;..., _ . .:.: Liu runiviiiL; • -._..:.;..^ Ow;\^.. >;i pages 
of various depositions attached to Smiths' brief, and which are not a part of the "Record" 
on appeal; (2) new issues and arguments, including such based upon documents which are 
statements, including hearsay statements in letters prepared by Brent Reynolds and the 
deposition testimony of Brent Reynolds, aua i'uuiuirts" references to and arguments based 
upon such; etc. 
Dated this / / c S T o f May, 2004. 
SIS II I I I & , GLAT ISER • " • 
felCHARD K. GLAUSER 
ERIC K. DAVENPORT 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. 
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Richard K. Glauser, #4324 
Eric K. Davenport, #5684 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
7351 So. Union Park Ave., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801)562-5555 
Attorneys for Hales & 
FILED 
Fourth jiid'cia! District Court 
ot oian County, Suae of Utah 
-iltM&k # — Uepufy 
IN THE FOURT- JUL ' C I - - DISTRiC" ;UF " IN AND FOR 
UT,~,r-, 
KELLY SMITH and LISA NIELSEN, 
Individually and as Heirs of JASON 
KELLY SMITH, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
HALES & WARNER CONST- . 
INC., a Utah Corporation; 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
HALES & WARNER CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
BRC, INC. a.k.a. BRENT REYNOLDS 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF HALES & WARNER 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., AND THE 
CORPORATION OF THE 
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
Civil No. 020401834 
Judge Claudia i ay^ock 
II, i fri l lddlit. 
U U 1 
Defendant "Hales & Warner Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Plaintiffs" and the "Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" came before this Court 
on August 20,2003. Shandor Badaruddin, Jeffrey D. Gooch and Justin T. Ashworth appeared 
on behalf of Plaintiffs; and the Plaintiffs also appeared at the hearing. Eric K. Davenport 
appeared on behalf of Hales & Warner Construction, Inc. (hereinafter "Hales & Warner"); 
Clifford T. Hales of Hales & Warner was also present. Robert R. Wallace appeared on behalf 
of the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
(hereinafter the "CPB"). Steven G. Morgan appeared on behalf of BRC, Inc., aka Brent 
Reynolds Construction, Inc., (hereinafter "BRC"). Oral argument was received on August 20, 
2003 from counsel for the parties. 
The Court will note that after the initial memoranda in support and opposition to these 
motions had been filed, the Court held a hearing on November 19,2002, and signed an order 
on January 31,2003, which order provided that the parties "shall have until February 28,2003 
to conduct and complete additional fact discovery;" the order also referred to the filing of 
supplemental memoranda by the parties after the additional discovery referred to was 
completed. After additional discovery was conducted, Plaintiffs, Hales & Warner and the CPB 
filed supplemental memoranda pertaining to the motions for summary judgment. Thereafter, 
supplemental oral argument on the motions for summary judgment was scheduled for August 
20, 2003, as referenced above. 
The Court, having reviewed the motions and memoranda submitted in support and in 
opposition to the motions, and having heard oral argument on the motions, hereby enters the 
2 
GO 1 
following order for good cause shown: 
I -E -:.-:; ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that "Hales & Warner 
Construction, Inc. s Motion for Summary Judgment aaainrt Plainriffc" aiui in I imn n n i 
Summary Judgment of the Defendant Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints" are hereby qrantecl 
The Court finds that there are no material disputes of fact which preclude summary 
judgment in favor of Hales i V " ' " - • " ~ - ; , — , &. •-_, titts' counsel 
agreed during oral argument that there was no dispute as to the material facts. 
<r hi i ih. 111 l.«, li"l,LJ Hit U-b entered an agreement with Hales & Warner for the 
construction of a cnurch house for the Highland 4th and 20th Wards. On or about May 10, 
1 ^ Q u Hakr • -Ji f i i le iyd into a subcontract agreement with BRC. unaer WHICH 
subcontract agreement BRC was to perform: "All of the Sectr- " ^ ' 'r • j 
. - ^ : „.,; ai;.. ,^- -abor and materials, all material handling and crane time, except wood 
trusses to be supplied by others but installed by BRC Inr "BPr Pntf-rm I in I u ml --on tract 
with "Egbert Construction, Inc.," (hereinafter "Egbert Construction"), wherein BRC was to 
provide the materials, and Egbert Constn n Urm \, ^ \n pn n IA HI I Am, d h i<. Am lection 
Ub luu rough carpentry. 
Egbert Construction hired am Hi nrnA A* mi AMIAII i in iidmi r »i'.> JI IU JOSU LUUIS. 
c.-. .m_m; 13, 1999, an Egbert Construction supervisor instructed Jason Smith, Michael 
Lewis, and Jose Louis tc upii1
 M| ' n vmnrfen fnnin'J wall Egbtfil construction had buill. On 
August 13, 1999, Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis raised the wooden framed 
wall, and were in tlv- j|vnr;e« ^f pnttinj tl i j I J A I M ] , „ ..studs when the wall started to fall and 
3 
001041 
fell on Jason Smith, causing Jason Smith's death (hereinafter the "Accident"). 
The Court finds that it is undisputed that it was Egbert Construction who hired, trained 
and educated Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis as it relates to the work being 
performed at the time of the Accident. Hales & Warner and the CPB did not hire, train or 
educate Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis as to the work they were performing at 
the time of the Accident. 
The Court finds that it is undisputed that Plaintiff Jason Smith was an employee of 
Egbert Construction priortoand atthet imeof the Accident. Michael Lewis and Jose Louis 
were also employees of Egbert Construction prior to and at the time of the Accident. 
The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jose Louis were under the 
direction, supervision, instruction and control of Egbert Construction at the time of the 
Accident. 
The Court finds that Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were not under the 
direction, supervision, instruction orcontrol of Hales & Warnerorthe CPB priorto and atthe 
time of the Accident. The Court finds that there is no evidence that Jason Smith, Michael 
Lewis and Jose Louis were ever under the direction, supervision, instruction, or control of 
Hales & Warner or the CPB. 
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Hales & Warner or the CPB instructed 
Egbert Construction or its employees (or BRC or its employees) to do the work being 
performed at the time of the Accident in a different manner or by way of a different method. 
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Hales & Warner or the CPB exerted 
control over the means utilized by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, or Jose Louis, in doing the 
4 
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work Jason Smith, Michael Lewis and Jose Louis were performing at the time of the Accident, 
or that Hales & Warner m tin |0PR mrprWpH ' im in.n / 
The Court finds that the employee of Hales & Warner on the site at the time of the 
Accident wn* in tlm i mi IIIM h In nlm rniil hi i I n involvement as to the work being 
performed, and the wall being put into place, by Jason Smith, Michael Lewis, and Jos-
at Hi--- lime i*»f thr -m ii'lr^ni. 
The Court also finds that there was no employee or representative nfthe cpp, -n Hi • 
site a' •* - Accident, and no employee or representative of the CPB had any 
involvement in the work being performed by Jason Smith, Mirn^ni i emi^ i j . ise u "ins HI 
tt : :.j „m e Accident 
The Court finds that the evidence indicates t licit if >m*ib Egheif > niioiiui LIUII u ho was 
controlling the means utilized and the manner of performance of the work being performed by 
Jason Smith, Michael Lew ~ • , - * . - * ^ .,__ _-:;w 
The Utah Supreme Court decision Thompson v. Jeffs, 1999 Utah 22, 972 2d. 322, is 
applicable, r * . ..- m the motions for summary 
judgment as to both Hales & Warner and the CPB. In its analysis section, the Utah Sijpreme 
Court in Thompson \nrA self. Ii mil niu general rule, stating: 
Utah adheres to the general common law rule that "the employer of an 
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an 
act or omission of the contractor or his servants." This general rule 
recognizes that one who hires an independent contractor and does not 
participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed 
owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of 
performance implemented. 
id. at fl 13 (citations omitted). The Thompson Court wen' i » i ^m i . Hm t in mn 
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exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of an employer of an independent contractor," 
including the "retained control" doctrine exception. 
The Court notes that Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated on the record in oral argument that 
if the standard for the "retained control" exception (to the general rule) set forth in Thompson 
relates to the "injury-causing aspect of the work," that Plaintiffs cannot meet the "retained 
control" exception, and that Defendants Hales & Warner's and the CPB's motions for 
summary judgment should be granted. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met, and cannot meet, the "retained control" 
exception to the general rule, pursuant to the contours of that standard outlined in Thompson. 
In discussing the contours of the "retained control" exception and the "active participation" 
requirement pertaining thereto, the Thompson Court states, among other things: 
In other words, to have "actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal 
employer must have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative 
detail of that work. "The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal 
duty must involve either the direct management of the means and method of the 
independent contractor's activities or the provision of the specific equipment 
that caused the injury." 
Thompson, 1999 UT 22, If 20 (citations omitted). The Thompson Court also points out that 
there must be exertion "of such control over the means utilized that the contractor cannot carry 
out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way." id. at fl 21 . 
Hales & Warner and the CPB did not exert affirmative control over the method or 
operative detail of the work and did not directly manage the means and methods of Egbert 
Construction's work nor provide the specific equipment used by Egbert Construction as to the 
work Jason Smith was performing at the time of the Accident. 
6 
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As referenced in the above quote, the standard set forth in Thompson also indicates 
that the exertion of control over the means utilized must relate fn the "iniury-causinq aspect of 
the work." ]d. (underlining added). Hales & Warner and the CPB did not exert control over 
the means i itilized as tc • tl le "ill iji n ) : ai isii ig aspect ol ' til i e } 'oi II ;:1 • : 1 ' lasoi i Sr i litl i, (ex ei i 
assuming the means utilized caused his death); rather, Egbert Construction controlled the 
mean is i itilized as tc tl ie * \ '• : i ! : Ias> : •! i Si \ litl i was pei foi i i iii ig at the tii neof the Accident. The 
activities of Hales & Warner and the CPB to which Plaintiffs refer did not relate to, and were 
in 11 .tn tiAttiln -n -11 : j i i ln il wet , the work Jasor. J;,
 :th was performing at the time of the 
accident, and did not cause the accident and death of Jason Smith. 
I i ie Court also finds that Hales & Warner and its employees were not employees of 
the CPB; the Court finds that Hales & Warner was an independent - ntra- I'M ' f thP^PR. 
F urther, the contracts and their provisions do not preclude summary judgment in favor of Hales 
& Warner and the CPB. 
DATED this ^ffU^day otSeptember, 2003. 
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EXAMINATION L MR. BADARUDDIN 
; :; ] 1 p rl 
£ E Q . C . E . E . D i N G S . 
MICHAEL LEWIS, 
3 a witness; for and on behalf of the plaintiff, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and testified ... 
i; ~^ 1 lows : 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BADARUDDIN: 
Q Can you state your name for me. 
A Michael Lewis. 
Q • And Mr. Lewis, what do y on do for a ] 2 < - 2 rig? 
A Well, currently, I work at a telephone survey 
company called Western Research. 
Q Okay. . What did you do back in August of 1999? 
P. I was a framer. 
Q A'framer. What is a framer? 
A We frame houses, buildings " >-- -'--• — ""-es. 
Just frame buildings. 
Q And can you tell in'- mo"*-3 spe:: rical.1 " what 
does framing entail? 
Building actual framework for a building, 
everything from the walls to the floors, the trusses, 
he joists, everything'. Framing the building. 
Q Who did you work for in August of 1999? 
A Egbert Construction. 
Q And when did you start working for Egbert? 
f, f. G i. 
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR 
U U U b 5 t) 
EXAMINATION B* MR. DAVENPORT 
16:29
 1 A Well, he was saying that he was going to put 
2 up like a monument or something, a little something in 
3 memory of Jason. 
4 Q He expressed some remorse about Jason1s death? 
16:29
 5 A Yes. I don't know if that ever happened or 
6 not, but that's what he told us.' 
7 Q Okay. Do you know who the architect was on 
8 this project? 
9 A No. 
16:29 io Q Do you know w h e t h e r o r no t you had any 
11 discussions with him? 
12 A No. I never personally, no. 
13 MR. BADARUDDIN: Thank you, Mr. Lewis. Some 
14 of the other gentlemen may have some questions, but I 
16:30 i5 don't. I appreciate you coming down. 
16 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry I was late. 
17 • MR. BADARUDDIN: Thatfs all right. 
18 MR. DAVENPORT: I've got some. 
19 EXAMINATION 
16:30 20 BY MR. DAVENPORT: 
21 Q Do you want me to call you Mr. Lewis or 
22 "Michael or Mike or what? 
23 A Mike, whatever. I don't even care. 
24 Q Mike, I'm going to probably ask you some of 
16:30 25 the same type of questions, but I just want to make sure 
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
I'm clear. So if you think, well, I already answered 
that, you have, and --
A It's okay, I understand that. 
Q First, I want to make sure that you understand 
that Ken Egbert and Ken Egbert Construction are separate 
and apart from Maurice Egbert, who was the employee of 
Hales & Warner. 
You understand that? 
• A Yeah, I understand that. 
Q And in the deposition of Maurice Egbert, as 
well as others that have been deposed, and the 
affidavits of not only yourself, but the other people 
we've obtained affidavits from, from Ken Egbert, all 
have indicated that Maurice Egbert, himself, the 
employee of Hales & Warner, never gave instructions to 
you or Jason Smith or Jose as to going and lifting that 
wall. And that's consistent -with your testimony today; 
correct? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q And also, everybody indicated that Maurice 
Egbert did not teach you or Jason Smith how to lift the 
wall; is that correct? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. 
A Well, to be honest with you, no one- rea-U, 
n M , i&L 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
his name. And he told me -- they taught me 
showed me how to raise the wall. 
they just 
MR. DAVENPORT: Are you saying Maurice Egbert, 
the general contractor, or are you saying --
THE WITNESS: Well, Ken Egbert was actually 
telling me to do it, but Maurice was there. I think he 
was in the' trailer or something. I don't know where he 
was . 
MR. DAVENPORT: There's a big difference 
between --
THE WITNESS: Okay, sorry. 
- Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) I'm just asking you, what 
did Maurice., if anything, tell you to do? 
MR. DAVENPORT: Keep in mind, distinguish Ken 
Egbert and Maurice. 
THE WITNESS: Really/ nothing. Honestly, I 
never talked to Maurice more than one or two words, more 
than, you know, if I needed to ask him a question or 
something. I never really talked to him very much. 
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) ' Did he ever tell you you 
were doing something wrong and to. stop it?. 
A No. That would more be the other framers . 
Q Who showed you how to raise a wall? 
A Ken Egbert. 
Q Okay. U b 0 J 8 2 
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR 8 














































He taught me the proper way, you know, how to 
en you're holding the wall. You donft want to 
ght up to it. You've got to put your foot back, 
, be ready to brace it, and bail if it goes out 
ay. 
Okay. 
That's what he told me. 
Do you remember Jason Smith? 
Yes. 
How did you know Jason Smith? 
He had been working there for maybe like two 
days. Just a couple of days. 
Did he get trained along with you? 
No. He started after I did. 
And what, if anything,- did he do, if you know 
d i d ? ' • • : . . • " 
He was the same as I was; he was a. laborer. 
And he worked for who? 
' He worked for Ken Egbert. 
And did you have any' supervisors when you 
worked with Ken Egbert? 
A Oh, man. We had -- there was Ken, and I guess 
one of the other supervisors, his. name was Manny. And 
then there was this guy named Dale. And they were 
always f ighting with each other. 
U U U U 5 1 
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR. 
EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
Q How, if at all, did they supervise you? 
A Like I said, if I was doing something wrong, 
you know, if I was cutting a board wrong, they'd come 
tell me. 
Q How did you know what boards to cut or what 
walls to build? 
A They would tell me. See,, usually what I would 
do is, I would cut the boards for them, and they would 
actually put the boards together, because I was just 
learning. That's kind of hew it goes when you're in 
that business. 
Q And so you would cut the boards. They would 
assemble the wall? 
A They'd say, I need 10 boards at 82 and a half 
inches or whatever, so I'd go cut 10 boards and bring 
them over to them. Sometimes I would assemble the wall. 
Q . How did you. know how to assemble a wall? 
A I was taught how. 
Q By? 
A By Manny. 
Q Do you know if Jason assembled any walls? 
A You know, I think from most of what I saw him 
doing, he did mostly cutting. 
Q Okay. Did you stand up any walls? 
A Oh, yeah. A lot of walls. 
UbOJdll 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
I'm clear. So if you think, well, I already answered 
that, you have, and --
A It's okay, I understand that. 
Q First, I want to make sure that you understand 
that Ken Egbert and Ken Egbert Construction are separate 
and apart from Maurice Egbert, who was the employee of 
Hales & Warner. 
You understand that? 
A Yeah, I understand that. 
Q And in the deposition of Maurice Egbert, as 
well as others that have been deposed, and the 
affidavits of not only yourself, but the other people 
we've obtained affidavits from, from Ken Egbert, all 
have indicated that Maurice Egbert, himself, the 
employee of Hales & Warner, never gave instructions to 
you or Jason Smith or Jose as to going and lifting that 
wall. And thatfs consistent with your testimony today; 
correct? 
A Yes, that's right. 
Q And also, everybody indicated that Maurice 
Egbert did not teach you or Jason Smith how to lift the 






Well, to be honest with you, no one really 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
Q Do you know who Brent Reynolds Construction, 
Inc. is? 
A I've heard of them. 
Q From the court papers? 
A Yeah. 
Q That I've sent you? 
A Well, just in the construction business, I've 
heard of them. 
Q Do you remember August 13 of 1999?' 
A Was that the day of the accident? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q Tell me what happened on that day. 
A Well, we had just finished eating lunch, and 
there was a wall that had already been built, and 
Manny - - I think it was Manny -- told me and Jason and a 
guy named Jose to go put it up. 
Q Okay. And then what happened? 
A So we went over there, and we lifted it up, 
and it wasn't quite onto the bolts, so Jason and Jose 
were holding it, and I went to go get a board, and I was 
going to, you know, try to use the leverage and jack it 
up onto the bolts. And I put it under there, and as 
soon as I put some pressure on there, the wall came 
down. Jose bailed out of the way, and it was like 
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR 000977 12 
EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
16:17
 1 Jason, he tried to catch it, and he kind of crouched 
2 down. I don't know if he was trying to catch it or 
3 what, it just came down on him. 
4 And they lifted the wall up, and Jason was 
16:17
 5 just laying there. There was already a puddle of blood 
6 • around his head like this. At first, I didn't know it 
7 was going to be serious. I thought he was knocked out 
8 or something, but I saw the blood. 
9 And we started yelling for help, and Maurice 
i6:i7io came out of the trailer, and the other guys, everyone 
11 else was working on the east -- yeah, the east side of 
12 the church, and there was a big wall already built on 
13 that side, so they couldn't really see into the church. 
14 I don't know if you guys have been out there 
16:1815 and seen the site or anything, but it ! s more on the west 
'16 side of the church where it happened. 
17 Q Okay. 
18 A So they all came running over from there, and 
19 Maurice got his cell phone, called the police, fire 
16:18
 20 department. 
21 Q And an ambulance came? 
22 A Yeah. And some guy came.that -- I guess he 
23 had a scanner or something. He was just a doctor. He 
24 was driving by, so he stopped. He got there way before 
16:18 25 the ambulance did. 
u b u j 7 b 
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relates to the wall .actually beginning its fall, it 
seems to me, and you correct me if I'm wrong, but you 
don't really know why the wall actually started to fall. 
You know you were in,the process of jimmying it up, but 
other than that, you don't know why it started to fall; 
is that a fair statement? 
A That's right. That's something I've been 
trying to figure out for quite a long time, because my 
first reaction was to blame myself. If I wasn't 
jimmying the wall, it wouldn't have fallen, so for a 
long time, I thought it was my fault, that I jimmied the 
wall and I made it fall, but then -- I just don't know. 
Q But had you previously jimmied walls like that 
and that type of. jimmying didn't cause the wall to fall? 
A Yeah, and that's the way I've done it since 
then, also. 
Q So at this juncture, you're not saying that 
your jimmying caused the wall' to fall; correct? That's 
not your position? 
A But I'm saying, it may have, I don't know. 
What I'm saying is, I don't know. 
Q Okay. Now, did anyone say anything during 
this process?. Like once it started to fall, did anybody 
yell out, Watch out, or, Get out of the way, or, Run? 
A Yeah, I did, and Jose yelled something in 
.—IJUij j j
 t 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
Spanish. I'm not sure what it was. 
Q What did you say? 
A I just -- honestly, I don't remember. It was 
something, Get out of the way, something along the lines 
of that. 
Q Did you hear Jason yell anything? 
A No. 
Q Let's assume that he was paying attention 
right there. Once he noticed the wall to start fall, if 
he would have just jumped out of the way, would he have 
time to do that instead of trying to catch it? 
A Yeah. If he would have just moved to the side 
rather than backwards, he would have been fine. 
Q As I understand it, a wall falling on its own 
volition, the initial falling motion, it is not like 
someone is on top of it and is throwing it down, it kind 
of starts out slowly, as it begins; is that kind of the 
movement that occurred here? 
A Yeah. It was kind of like it all went into 
slow motion. It was weird. 
Q Now, based upon my prior conversation with 
you, I believe you indicated to me that it was a calm 
day. It wasn't real windy or something like that. 
A Yeah, it wasn't super windy or anything. 
Q It was a calm, sunny day; is that a fairr.r ;,n; 
Z ' — U U ITJ / i 
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 Q 
or not you ever saw him on the construction 
or not? 
I do not remember faces or names real easy. 
time for me personally to develop a familiarity 
erson's face. 











: the door 








I was in the job trailer. 
How far away from where the wall fell? • 
Probably 100 feet. 
And were there windows looking out over the 
The door window did look toward the project. 
And how did you become aware of the fact that 
d been an incident there on the project? 
One of Ken Egbert's guys came and knocked on 
and said we needed to call 911, that there had 
accident. 
Who was that? 
I don't recall. 
What do you recall about him, if anything? 
I don't remember. It's been too long. 
How many employees of Mr. Egbert were on the 
on August 13, 1999? | 
. I don't remember the exact number. That
 rwauld 
UUUvi 12—! 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
i4;46 i
 a n y q u e s t i o n s . 
2
 Let me j u s t a sk a few q u i c k q u e s t i o n s . 
3 EXAMINATION 
4. BY MR. DAVENPORT: 
i4-*46 5 Q Did you ever tell Jason Smith how to place 
6 that wall on the bolts that are there on the 
7 construction site? 
8 A No, I did not. 
9 Q Did you ever instruct or tell any Egbert 
;i4:47 IQ employee how to raise that wall or place that wall on 
11 the bolts? 
12 A No, I did not. 
13 Q Did you ever exert control over, firmly take 
14 control over the method that.Jason Smith was using in 
#4:47 15 placing that wall onto the bolts? -
16 A No, I did not. 
17 Q Did you ever firmly exert control over any 
18 other employee of Egbert Construction or Brent Reynolds 
19 Construction as to the method in which they were placing 
14:48
 20 a wall onto bolts? 
21 A No., I did not. 
22 Q Did you ever affirmatively take control over 
23 or exert control over the operative detail of Jason 
24 Smith's work relating to the placement of that wall onto 
^ 14: 48 2 5 those bolts? " r f C\ H 
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14:50 2 5 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you ever affirmatively take control or 
exert control over the operative detail of any Egbert 
employee or Brent Reynolds Construction employee as it 
relates to the placement of walls onto bolts? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you ever prohibit any Egbert employee or 
any Reynolds Construction employee from using the method 
they chose in placing a wall onto bolts for that 
construction site? 
A No, I did not. 
Q As it relates to this construction project, do 
you know whether or not you were in any.way involved in 
the bidding process for that job? 
A Bidding process itself, no. 
Q As it relates to any project, I just want you 
to describe for me as to how involved, if any, have you 
been in the past as it relates to the bidding process 
for any j ob. 
A Occasionally, Cliff and Joel will talk to 
superintendents about how they felt about working with 
certain subcontractors and ask for our opinions, how 
they work, qualities of workmanship, if we like working 
with them. 
Q Other than that, you wouldn't get invqlved; WM 
_ Z. ITU it J M) 
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15:04 2 5 
if that was the same methodology used in raising the 
wall which fell on Jason Smith. 
Q So you didn't see the methodology; isn't that 
correct? 
A I did not see the methodology. 
Q Now, let me ask you another question. Did you 
approve the methodology that was used in the raising of 
the wall that killed Jason Smirh? 
A I neither approved or disapproved. 
Q So you didn't approve that methodology, did 
you, 
MR.' DAVENPORT: Asked and answered. 
THE WITNESS: I neither approved or 
disapproved. 
MR. MORIARITY: What did you say? 
MR. HALES: Just yawning. 
MR. MORIARITY: You yawn with words? 
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Now, Mr. Schick would come 
to the site only once a month? 
A He would come at least once a month. 
Q Yes, but would he come more often than that? 
A He would occasionally make a visit. 
Q How often? 
A I don't know. 
Q Did you wa 
- r r ;"• O Q 
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WITNESS: I cannot be at all sp< 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY 
10:47
 1 A N O E to my knowledge. 
2 Q Prior to the time that the Smith boy was 
3 killed, was the framing on schedule? 
4 A No. 
10:48
 5 Q How far was it behind schedule? 
6 A Probably a couple of weeks, maybe three weeks. 
7 Q Why was it behind schedule? 
8 A That would be based on the work of Egbert 
9 Construction. 
10:48
 10 Q Yes, but why was it behind schedule, if you 
11 know? 
12 A I would say because of their not having done 
13 churches before. I had found problems that had to be 
14 corrected in their framing, such as heights of walls. 
10:48
 15 We had to tear apart one whole side, back section of a 
16 wall, that they had made an inch too tall, and we had to 
17 tear that apart and rebuild it. Just Egbert 
18 Construction not being able to watch what was going on, 
19 I guess. 
10:49 20 Q Why weren't they able to watch what was going 
21 on? 
22 A Actually, with that situation, with the wall, 
23 BRC had actually instructed them to build it that way to 
24 save time in cutting studs. And the plan had called for 
io:49 25 the shorter wall, and we had requested that theyUSdflA^w 









Who is BRC? 
Brent Reynolds Construction. 
What role did they play in this p 
They were the contracted framers. 
Wait a minute. I thought you sai 







pro j e 









Brent Reynolds Construction had verb 
th Egbert Construction to come in 
ct, because Brent Reynolds was una 
ct at the time. 
How did you find that out? 
In speaking with Ken Egbert. 
How did you first meet Ken Egbert 
The day he came on the job site. 
What day was that? 










an. He was waiting for and unloading mater 
sure 
Q 
exactly what date that was. 
I want to make sure I'm understandin 
Had you had previous work at all 




I had called him on the phone to 
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Can you restate the question, please. 
Did you then give Ken Egbert your approval as 
to him having Bruce Lemmon become the foreman on the 
job? 




THE WITNESS: That is Ken Egbert's call as to 
11 run his crew. 
(BY MR. MORIARITY) Did you or did you not 
approval to Mr. Lemmon becoming the foreman 












That's not for me to do. 
So is your answer, No, I did not give my 
MR. DAVENPORT: He's answered the question. 
(BY MR. MORIARITY) Please answer. 
I neither approved or disapproved. 
I see . 
As a superintendent, I work with the crews 
given me, unless I see a problem. 
Given you by whom? 
By the subcontractors. 
Well, who was the subcontractor that gave you 
Mr. Lemmon? 
A Ken Egbert. uubJuH 
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Was there a contract with Mr. Egbert? 
MR. DAVENPORT: It's been asked and answered 
tes, but you can go ahead and answer that again. 
THE WITNESS: I believe I've answered that. 
(BY MR, MORIARITY) Please answer. 
There was verbal agreement, as told me by Ken, 
Ken and Brent Reynolds. 
Did you trust Mr. Lemmon? 
I trusted Ken Egbert's qualifications to 
is own men. 
Let me ask you a question. Did you trust Ken 
qualifications to select his own men? 
Yes. 
Now, let me ask you a different question. Did 










As I worked with him, I developed a trust and 
standing of his knowledge of construction, how 
plans and work with his men. 
So is the answer, then, that you trusted him? 
I developed a trust for him. 
Did you find him to be an honest and truthful 
Yes, I did. 
Thanks very much. 
How often did you deal with Bruce Lemm<g]|/?y J B 4 
EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY 
them redo? 
A There were several items. 
Q Anything else? 
A Not enough manpower, 
Q Yes. Tell me about that. 
A Egbert Construction is a small company, and 
hires on, as we do, as needed, new employees, and he was 
building his crew, but it wasn't coming very fast. 
MR. DAVENPORT: If you know this personally, 
thatTs fine, but if you're speculating on someone else's 
statement to you, you need ~o tell him it's based on 
someone else's statement. 
THE WITNESS: I had discussed this with Ken. 
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Yes. And this was the 
explanation given to you by Ken Egbert; correct? 
A Yes . 
Q Did he, Ken Egbert, tell you whether or not 
his framers were experienced? 
A I did not go into the qualifications of his 
employees. 
Q Well, isn't it one of your roles as the 
superintendent to make sure chat the work is done in a 
workmanlike manner? 
A Could you repeat that, please? 
0 Yes. Isn't it one of your roles as the, r .pQ 
^-4 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
Lumber that has your name on it. 
Does that sound accurate? 
A Yes. 
Q I'm going to show you the subcontract 
agreement, have you thumb through it, and I'm going to 
ask you after you have an opportunity to review it 
whether or not this is the subcontract you were 
referring to previously and whether or not that's your 
signature. 
(Off-the-record discussion) 
Q (BY MR. DAVENPORT) Is this a copy of the 
subcontract agreement entered into between Hales & 
Warner Construction, Inc. and BRC, Inc.? 
A It looks like it, yes'. 
Q And that's dated May 10, 1999? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that your signature found on page 8? 
A Yes . 
Q You signed it as president of BRC? 
A Yes. . BRC, Inc. 
Q Now, let me ask you a couple of quick general 
questions. As we've gone through all of these 
documents, it appears to me that the manner in which 
this matter proceeded was that Hales & Warner would 
still deal directly with you as their subcontractor and 
, f, f UUUJ 0 x. 
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1 4 : 2 5
 1 y o u w o u l d , i n t u r n , d e a l w i t h Ken E g b e r t C o n s t r u c t i o n a s 
2 your sub subcontractor. 
3 Is that a fair statement? 
4 A Yes. 
14:25
 5 Q Now, as I understand it, you only sub 
6 subcontracted to Ken Egbert part of your subcontract 
7 with Hales & Warner; is that correct? In other words, 
8 you kept the part of purchasing materials and things 
9 like that. 
^25 10 A Yes. 
11 Q And the subcontract refers to an amount of 
12 $156,000. This is the subcontract between Hales & 
13 Warner and BRC; correct? 
14 A Yes. 
14:2615 Q And I couldn't hear you too well over here, 
16 but did you say that your sub subcontract between BRC 
17 and Egbert Construction was $72,000? 
18 A I believe that's correct. 
19 Q Okay. Now, as I understand it, at the 
14:26 20 beginning of this project there was a preconstruction 
21 meeting that you attended; is that correct? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q And as I also understand it,- not only were you 
24 issued checks as it relates to materials obtained by 
14:27 25 you, but you were also issued checks by Hales & War^e"^ (] 
EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
A I gave Hales & Warner a bid to do the framing 
on the job. 
Q I want to show you Exhibit 32. 
(Exhibit No, 32 is marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Can you take a look at 
Exhibit 31 for me. 
A This says 32. 
Q That's what I meant, Exhibit 32. Just 
checking to see if you're paying attention. 
Could you please take a look at Exhibit 32. 
A Yes. 
Q I s Exhibi t 32 the b id you sent to Hales & • 
Warner? 
A Yes. 
Q For the framing? 
A Yes. 
Q And what happened next? 
A They sent me a contract, and I signed it and 
sent it back to them. 
Q And then what? 
A I was busy and didn't finish up some other 
work that I had going and couldn't get' to this one. 
They scheduled it, and so I got Ken Egbert to do the 
work. 
Q How exactly did you go about getting Ken.. 
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR 7 
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13:21 2 5 
Egbert to do the work? 
A I called him up and asked him if he'd be 
interested in doing this job. 
Q Who is Ken Egbert? 
A A contractor. 
Q Is he an employee of yours? 
A No. 
Q Is he a friend of yours? 
A He's an acquaintance. 
Q Is he a business associate? 
A Yes. 
Q And what did Mr. Egbert say about doing some 
framing for you? 
A He said he would be interested in doing it. 
Q I was looking at Exhibit 32. There's more 
than framing; am I correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you ask Mr. Egbert to help you out with 
all aspects of the work described on Exhibit 32 or just 
the framing? What did you ask Mr. Egbert to do? 
A Just the framing on it. I told him I would 
still supply the material and he could do the framing on 
it. 
Q And what is "framing"? 
A Putting the frame structure together., the 
0 0 U J 3 '^  
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The structure of it. 
And the structure -- you've got to understand 




Build the walls, put the roof on. 
That's something I can understand. You wanted 


















And stand them up? 
Yes. 
What about the roof? 
Do the roof, too. 
And you were going to supply him all the wood 
that he needed to build these walls? 
He supplied the nails. 
Okay. And what about the men who were going 
of this work? 
His employees. 
What, if any, involvement did you have in the 
of those men? 
None . 
Did you tell him how many men you needed? I 
I told him he would need 12 to 14 men.- .-
 r -. <-• ~i 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
1 4 : 4 1
 1 MR. DAVENPORT: T h a t ' s a l l I h a v e . 
2 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR. BADARUDDIN: j 
4 Q Did you ever visit the Highland 4 and 20 
14:41
 5 project site? ' 
6 A During the framing? 
7 Q At any time. 
8 A I did at the preconstruction meeting. 
9 Q Okay. 
14:41
 10 A And one time when the roof was being done, I 
11 I sent some new guys down there, and I had to take a 
12 paycheck down to them off of one of my projects. 
13 Q So other than those two occasions, you never 
14 set foot on the property? 
14:42 15 & I went down and cleaned some material up after 
16 everything was done. 
17 Q Okay. So other than those three occasions, 
18 you never set foot on the property? 
19 A No. 
14:42 20 Q Did you act in the capacity of manager or 
21 something like that where you would be off site, but 
22 somehow involved in the project? 
2 3 A No. 
2 4 MR. BADARUDDIN: All right. Thank you. I 
14:42 25 don't have any more questions. UUUJOO 
EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
Q Let me break it down. Did you ever give any 
instructions to any Egbert employees as it relates to 
this project or how to frame it? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever give any instructions to Ken 
Egbert, himself, as to how he should go about framing 
the project or any projections as to employees or safety 
concerns or anything like that? 
A No. 
Q Did you, yourself, inspect the site from time 
to time? 
A No. 
Q A question was asked in Dean Schick*s 
deposition whether or not it would be appropriate to 
have a person on the site who didn't have any 
experience, and he referred to the fact that everybody 
has to start sometime. 
Is it appropriate, in your mind, to say, if 
you have a crew on the site, which includes experienced 
workmen, to hire someone brand new and have them work 
alongside experienced workmen in framing such a 
building? 
A Yes . 
Q You've indicated that you've done a number of 
projects for the LDS Church; is that correct? - *- r ~r<? 
- ' t u n ;• f » n 


























14:12 2 5 
Q And you don't have any personal knowledge as 
to whether Hales & Warner instructed the plaintiff --
when I say the plaintiff, I'm referring to the decedent, 
Jason Smith - - as to how you would go about placing that 
wall on foundation bolts; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q It's my understanding you don't have any 
personal knowledge as to how, in fact, the accident 
happened, whether Jason Smith just let go of the wall, 
tripped over his foot or whatever, you have no personal 
knowledge whatsoever as to how the accident, in fact, 
happened; correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Let me refer you back to Exhibit 37. 
Now, according to my notes, as we walk through 
these initial letters, it wasn't until we got to the 
letter of April 25, 1999, that you indicated that you 
understood that it was around that point in time is when 
you sent over some additional workmen; is that correct? 
A You said April or August?' 
Q August 25. Let me restate the question. 
We reviewed some initial letters prior to 
August 25, 1999 relating to workmen, or at least this 
VIKI HATTON CSR/RPR 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
14:12
 1 one, Exhibit 34. And then we reviewed the August 25, 
2 1999 letter, and I believe it was your testimony that it 
3 was after that letter that you'd sent some additional 
4 workmen to the site; is that correct? 
i*-"" 5 A Yes. 
6 Q Now, in the August 3, 2000 letter, I want to 
7 review a couple of sentences in there and make sure I 
8 have it in the right context. 
9 In that letter to you of August 25, 1999, it 
i4:i3io refers to the fact that if the issue isn't remedied that 
11 they -- let me find the exact language -- I guess 
12 J reserve the right to engage additional help; correct? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And what I guess I'm getting at is in the 
14:13
 15 first paragraph of your letter, when we refer to that 
16 you, meaning Hales & Warner, looked for other framers to 
17 do the work but could not find any, was that after this 
18 August 25 letter you were referring to? 
19 A No. It was before the beginning of the 
14:13 20 proj ect . 
21 Q Now, later on in the letter when you refer ..to 
22 sending other men,'you're talking about the time period 
23 after August 25, 1999; correct? 
24 A Yes. • . . 
14:14
 25 Q Now, as it relates to the second paragraph, as 
U u U J ^  o 
EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
14:17
 1 that I knew of. 
2 Q Okay, what was that? 
3 A When they put sheetrock in the chapel and the 
4 cultural area so they couldn't frame some door pockets,. 
14:17
 5 Q Other than those three, any other ones you 
6 were personally aware of? 
7 A No. 
8 Q So as I understand it, you have no personal 
9 knowledge of Hales & Warner ever instructing a framing 
14:17
 10 subcontractor or a framing subcontractor's' employees as 
11 to the method in which they should raise a wall from the 
12 J ground to an upright position; is that correct? 
13 A That's correct. 
14 Q And you have no personal knowledge whether or 
14:1815 not Hales & Warner ever gave any instructions as to any 
16 framing subcontractor or its employee as to how to hold 
17 a wall that has not yet been tied into place after it's 
18 been raised; is that correct? 
19 A Correct. 
14:18 20 Q And you have no personal knowledge as to 
21 whether • Hales & Warner ever gave any framing 
22 subcontractor instructions as to how to put a wall onto 
23 the bolts after it's been raised; is that correct? 
24 A That's correct. 
14:19 25 Q Now, as I've reviewed documents containing the 
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A All I know is according to this and what I 
talked with Ken about. 
Q But you don't think that the job was right on 
schedule and Mr. Hales was just being unreasonable? 
A No. 
Q And then' it talks about your construction 
subcontract, and I don't have any questions about that. 
What, if anything, did you do after you 
received this letter? 
A I called Ken Egbert. 
Q And told him? 
A That he needed more men on the job. 
Q Did you do anything else? 
A I think about this time I told him I would 
send some men down off of my crew, and on his payroll, 
and he could use them however he saw fit. 
Q And these men of yours, were they experienced 
or inexperienced,'or did it vary? 
A They were experienced on churches . 
Q And on framing? 
A Framing churches. 
Q How many men did you send? 
A I don't remember. I think there was four or 
five 
Okay. Let me ask you about what I ' m g a ^ n c u t o 
oiib Jo 1 
EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
13:43
 1 Q It was August 13 of 1999. 
2 Do you know whether you were sending men to 
3 . Hales & Warner's Highland 4 and 20 project before and 
4 after August 13 of 1999? 
13:43
 5 A It was after that. 
6 Q Let me ask you about the second paragraph of 
7 Exhibit 37. It says, "From the very beginning, your 
8 superintendent interfered with the framing process." 
9 Who is the superintendent? 
13:43
 1 0 A I don' t know. 
11 Q Well, do you remember what he was doing, how 
12 he was interfering with the framing process? 
13 A Ken called me and told me that they wouldn't 
14 let him frame some of the walls the way he wanted to 
13:44 2.5 frame them, told him it wasn't effective framing the way 
16 they wanted them framed, and they wouldn't let him frame 
17 them in that manner. And I tried to help him out by 
18 calling down there and talking to -- I don't remember if 
19 I called Cliff Hales or who I 'called. 
13:44 20 Q Do you know how Egbert wanted to. frame? 
21 A Yes . 
22 Q How did he want to frame? 
23 A Well, the walls we're talking about is -- he 
24 wanted to frame them -- they had a rake on them to 
13
=44 25 follow the roof joist in one area, and he wanteglyt^ joj 5 0 
EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
frame them that way, and they didn't want him to until 
the roof joists were up so they could make sure the rake 
on the wall matched the joist. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Let me ask him, if you don't 
mind, did you say "rake"? 
THE WITNESS: Slope on the wall, the rake on 
the wall. 
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) What is a "rake"? 
A Slope. 
Q Okay. That's the way Ken Egbert wanted to do 
it; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Kow did the superintendent want him to do it? 
A He wanted him to run the studs along and stand 
the wall, and when the joists were up, cut the studs off 
and put the top plates on. 
Q Okay. And how was that difference resolved? 
In other words, who won out, Ken Egbert or the 
superintendent? 
A The superintendent. He wanted it done his 
way, and I told Ken he had to do it his way if he 
couldn't resolve it. 
MR. MINNOCK: "Do it his way," you mean do it 
the superintendent's way? 
THE WITNESS: Do it the superintendent's way. 
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Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN* Well, then the sentence 
continues, referencing, I think, the superintendent 
"telling them that they couldn't do it the way they were 
used to framing and caused the framer many problems, 
costing extra time and material." 
Is that what you've told me about or is there 
something else the superintendent was doing? 
A It just cost extra material to frame it that 
way, because you can use shorter boards and it costs 
more time to frame it with — standing the wall and then 
cutting the studs off later. 
Q Was there some other aspect of the framing 
that the superintendent was interfering with? 
A They wanted to frame the outside walls an inch 
higher and not cut the studs off; the superintendent 
didn't want them to do that. 
Q And what did the plans or specifications call 
for, as far as one inch this way or that? 
A You have to meet the specified elevations. 
Q Sure. So Ken Egbert wanted to build it, say, 
one inch higher than the superintendent; correct? 
A Yes . 
Q What did the plans say? 
A The plans said it was supposed to be one inch 
lower than Ken wanted to build it. ^ .  . 
y \j y J >t ".» 
EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
Q 
paragraph 
I've got you. 
In the second sentence of the second 
, it says, "This interference continued 
throughout the framing of the building." 
A 
! Q 
What did you mean by that? 
•I don't remember right now. 
Was there some aspect of framing 




I don!t know. 
This paragraph seems to say from 
that the 
L the very 
that the superintendent interfered, and then 
it goes on, and then it says the interference continued 
through the framing of the building. The 
interpreted it is that the superintendent 
interfering from the beginning to the end 
framing p rocess. 
MR. DAVENPORT: I'm going to obj 
asking him to speculate. As I- understand 
testimony , he wasn't even on the job site. 
just object to the lack of foundation. He 
any personal knowledge as to what actually 
MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm asking him 
his writing, if he's able to do so. 
question 
MR. MINNOCK: Do you understand 











meant by that 
•< ..„ •„ r , "• T ,,**?»„ , , „ . 
u u u y i± t 
EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
13:48
 1 in terms of the duration the interference lasted. 
2 THE WITNESS: I don't remember other 
3 specifics. Those are the two specifics I remember. Ken 
4 told me that they weren't being able to frame like they 
13:48
 5 wanted to, and so I put that in there to try and help 
6 Ken out. 
7 • Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Okay. And what I'm 
8 really wondering is -- tell me if this is correct. Did 
9 the superintendent interfere with the framing process 
i3:4810 from the very beginning? 
11 MR. DAVENPORT: Objection; lacks foundation. 
12 He's already testified he wasn't there. 
13 MR. MINNOCK: You can answer. 
14 THE WITNESS: Exterior walls are one of the 
13:4915 first ones you frame, so that was the beginning of the 
16 proj ect. 
17 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Okay. Did his 
18 interference ever stop? 
19 A I don't know. 
13=49 20 MR. DAVENPORT: Same objection. 
21 Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) And then the last 
22 sentence of the second paragraph, "If it wasn't wanting 
23 something done out of sequence, it was putting other 
24 subs and/or material in the way so the framers could not 
13:49
 25 do their job. " 
u 0 u u lt H 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
Can you tell me what you meant by.that 
sentence? 
A I know of one instance. This was after that, 
I went down 
MR. DAVENPORT: Excuse me, after what? 
THE WITNESS: It' was before the completion of 
the building. It was during the framing of the roof. I 
had to go down and give -- I sent some other guys down 
on the job, and I -- they needed a paycheck from me on 
work that they'd done for me, so I took a paycheck down 
to them, and they had stacked sheetrock in the way 
inside the cultural hall/chapel area of the building. 
And that's what I meant by putting material in the way 
so that they couldn't complete the project. 
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Was there any other thing 
you might have been referring to? 




MR. BADARUDDIN: Let me ask you about some 
other exhibits we've already marked. Let me ask you to 
look at Exhibit 29. That's the daily from August 4, 
1999 . 
MR. DAVENPORT: What is it? 
u u u J 4 o 
\7TVT WATTON C S R / R P R 30 
EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
one, Exhibit 34. And then we reviewed the August 25, 
1999 letter, and I believe it was your testimony that it 
was after that letter that you'd sent some additional 
workmen to the site; is that correct? 
A Yes'. 
Q Now, in the August 3, 2000 letter, I want to 
review a couple of sentences in there and make sure I 
have it in the right context. 
In that letter to you of August 25, 1999, it 
refers to the fact that if the issue isn't remedied that 
they -- let me find the exact language - - I guess 
reserve the right to engage additional help; correct? 
A Yes . 
Q And what I guess I'm getting at is in the 
first paragraph of your letter, when we refer to that 
you, meaning Hales & Warner, looked for other framers to 
do the work but could not find any, was.that after this 
August 25 letter you were referring to? 
A No. It was before the beginning of the 
project. 
Q Now, later on in the letter when you refer to 
sending other men,'you're talking about the time period 
after August 25, 1999; correct? 
A Yes . 
Q Now, as i t r e l a t e s to the second paragrqjj^jpQ J 4 4 
V I K I HATTON CSR/RPR 44 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
14:15
 1 Q Could you understand the logic behind building 
2 it the way they did, even though you may have felt that 
3 another way would have been cheaper in cost? 
4 A Yes. 
14:15
 5 Q Now, I think you explained before this 
6 sentence where it says, "From the very beginning; your 
7 superintendent interfered with the framing process," and 
8 I believe you indicated that that was referring to this 
9 initial wall that was one inch too high; correct? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Would you agree that there was nothing 
12 inappropriate with the superintendent asking Ken Egbert 
13 to comply with the plans and build it an inch lower as 
14 specified by the plans? 
I4-*6 15 A Correct . 
16 Q Now, as I understand it, the references 
17 relating to this interference relate to those two 
18 issues, namely, number one, building the wall as 
19 specified by the plans, one inch lower than it had been 
14:1620 built, and the other issue was relating to the sheer 
21 wall with the studs sticking out the top; correct? 
22 A Are you saying that's the only issues? 
23 Q Those were the two you were referring to as 
24 far as interference; right? That you had knowledge of? 
14
^
1725 A No . There was another issue that I kno^. QI>,Q 
I . — — u U U J * "— 
EXAMINATION BY MR. DAVENPORT 
that I knew of. 
Q Okay, what was that? 
A When they put sheetrock in the chapel and the 
cultural area so they couldn't frame some door pockets. 
Q Other than those three, any other ones you 
were personally aware of? 
A No. 
Q So as I understand it, you have no personal 
knowledge of Hales & Warner ever instructing a framing 
subcontractor or a framing subcontractor's employees as 
to the method in which they should raise a wall from the 
ground to an upright position; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And you have no personal knowledge whether or 
'not Hales & Warner ever gave any instructions as to any 
framing subcontractor or its employee as to how to hold 
a wall that has not yet been tied into place after it's 
been raised; is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And you have no personal knowledge as to 
whether • Hales & Warner ever gave any framing 
subcontractor instructions as to how to put a wall onto 
the bolts after it's been raised; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
u& 
Tab 5 
FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY 
time of the accident. 
Did you witness the accident? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you know how many men were working on that 
wall at the time of the accident? 
A No, I, did not . 
Q • How did you find out how many men were working 
on that wall? 
A Through conversations after the fact. 
Q Okay. Did you ever at any time know before 
that wall was raised how many men were going to raise 
it? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you ever give any instructions to the men 
that were raising that wall as to how to raise that 
wall? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you ever give any instructions to anyone 
from Brent Reynolds Construction or Egbert Construction 
as to how to raise'that wall? 
A No. 
Q Did' you ever give any instructions at any time 
to anyone at Brent Reynolds Construction or Egbert 
Construction as to how to raise any wall? 
A No. 
VTPfT PATTON C S R / R P R 99 
FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY 
12:38 1 Q Did you ever tell anyone else from Hales & 
2 Harrier, including Maurice Egbert, to give instructions 
3 to Egbert Construction or its enployees or Brent 
4 Reynolds Construction or its employees as to how to 
12:39
 5 raise a particular wall? 
6 . A No. 
7 Q Are you aware of Maurice Egbert or anyone else 
8 at Hales 5c Warner .Construction ever giving the Egbert 
9 employees who were working on the wall at the time of 
12:39io the accident instructions relating to how to raise that 
11 wall? 
12 A No. 
13 Q It is my understanding, based on your prior 
14 testimony, you do not have any personal knowledge as to 
12:4015 how/ in fact, the accident actually happened; is that 
1 6 correct? • 
17 . A That's correct. 
18 MR. DAVENPORT: That's all I have. 
19 MR. MORIARITY: Now there's some, more good 
12;40 20 news or bad news. What do you want first? 
21 THE WITNESS: You have more questions. . 
22 MR. MORIARITY: What's that? 
23 THE WITNESS: Let me assume again. You have 
24 more questions. 
1 2 : 4 1
 25 MR. MORIARITY: Only because of what t h e s e w r \ 
I : _ . B-WHT SA 
EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY 
Q Now, the first wall that Ken Egbert 
Construction built was too tall, wasn't it? 
A Yes-. • 
Q How did you know that? 
A How did I personally know? 
Q . Yes. 
A Maurice called me. 
Q Where did he call you at? 
A" ' On my cell phone. 
Q What did he say? 
A He told me the problem. 
Q This is another problem that the problem 
solver would take care of; correct? 
A Jointly, yes . 
Q Jointly with whom? 
A Maurice. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Can we go off the record for a 
minute. 
(Off-the-record discussion) 
Q (BY MR. MORIARITY) Was Maurice Egbert an 
officer of Hales & Warner's partnership? 
A ItTs a corporation and/'no, he was not. 
Q Was he a director? 
A No. 
Q He was an employee; correct? 
U U \ * J o & 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY 
A Yes, 
Q Now, when he called you on your cell phone and 
told you that Egbert Construction had constructed a wall 
that was too tall, what, if anything, did you do about 
solving that problem? 
A First of all, I asked him why, what their 
thinking was. Oftentimes, subcontractors come up with 
what they think is a better idea. 
Q And what was Maurice's information that he 
gave you in response to your inquiry? 
A It was so that they could use precut studs. 
Q So what did you then do? 
A I remember telling Maurice ITd get back to 
him. I mulled it over in my own mind, called him back, 
and told him to have them do it the way -- according to 
plans and specs. 
Q This was the first wall that Egbert 
Construction had constructed; correct? 
A I believe so. 
Q And isn't it true that Maurice told you that 
when he had asked Ken Egbert why he was doing it that 
way, that Mr. Ken Egbert told Mr. Maurice Egbert that 
the reason was because BRC, specifically Mr. Reynolds, 
had told him to do it that way; is that correct? 
A That was my understanding. 
- r f \ 0 1 
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Hales & Warner Construction? 
A It's signed by Clifford Hales. 
Q May I see it, please? 
The date of this permit is May what, 1999? 
A May 17. 
Q ' How long did Hales & Warner have to construct 
this Highland project for the LDS Church? 
A I'd have to review the documents. 
Q What documents do you need to review? 
A It should be in the spec book. It might be 
part of the contract. 
Q Exhibit 21, in front of you there, tell me 
what that is. 
A Specifications for the Highland building. 
Q Yes. Now, can you look at that and tell me 
how long it was that Hales & Warner had to construct the 
Highland church for the LDS Church. 
A. Time of completion, "Time limit for completion 
of this work shall be 330 calendar days after time set 
forth in written notice to proceed as noted in'the 
agreement." 
Q And what page is that? 
A It's invitation to bid, I'm assuming page 1. 
Q .And how many days was it? 
. A 3 3 0 . 
u u u u o b 
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EXAMINATION BY MR. MORIARITY 
Q From what? 
A From written notice to proceed. 
Q And when did you receive the written notice to 
proceed? 
A I don'i know the date. 
Q Well, what would you have to look at to 
determine that? 
A They send me out a formal notice to proceed; 
ITd have to find that. 
Q Well, that's a document that pertains to the 
Highland project, setting time limits; isn't that 
correct? 
A Yes . 
Q You received it at least prior to the May 17 
issuing of the permit as shown in Exhibit 22; isn't that 
correct? 
A I don't know that, sir. 
Q You don't? Well, who sets the time schedules 
for a project on behalf of Hales & Warner? 
A I generally write the schedule. 
Q Where is the schedule for the Highland 
project? 
A I'm assuming it's in my office somewhere. 
Q When you prepare this schedule, do you break 
it down as to various parts of the project, sir? 
VIKI HATTCN CSR/RPR 
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A Yes. 
Q Tell me what parts of the project you would 
set time limits on, and using as an example this 
Highland project. 
A I would set a time limit on forming and 
pouring footings, a time limit to excavate for the 
footings, a time limit to form and pour the foundation, 
time to prepare the slab, a time limit to pour the slab. 
Basically, every portion of that work has a time affixed 
to it. 
Q Why? 
A It's a matter of coordination between subs. 
Q Why is that important? 
A It keeps everyone informed. They know what: to 
expect up front. It makes jobs go smoother. 
Q When you say it lets everyone know what to 
expect up front, what do you mean? 
A It means that we send out a schedule, either 
with their contract or shortly after. They can review 
it and plan for those time schedules. 
Q For example, Exhibit 14, what is that? 
A It's a subcontract from Hales & Warner 
Construction to BRC, Incorporated. 
Q Is the schedule attached to it? 
A No, sir. 
_ . — , — _
 (—{—- n 4— 
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FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
c o n t r a c t o r e n t e r i n g a c o n t r a c t w i t h a s u b c o n t r a c t o r , i s 
t h e r e ? 
A N o . 
Q And, in fact, there's a whole separate section 
in here on subcontractors, and I believe your prior 
testimony was it was obviously contemplated that Hales & 
Warner would use subcontractors and that they, in turn, 
could use sub subcontractors; is that your 
understanding? 
A Yes. 
Q And you didn't have a problem with that? 
A No. 
Q Okay. And so there's nothing out of the 
ordinary of maybe a subcontractor either engaging 
someone just to help them out, or even to do most of the 
work on their behalf, is there? 
A Right. 
Q Okay. In the contract, it also refers to, 
"And the architect shall be the owner's representative 
during the construction period, and shall have the 
authority to act on behalf of the owner, to the extent 
provided in the contract document." 
That was the role being filled by Butler & 
Evans; correct? 
U U b U ?' 
A Yes. 
EXAMINATION BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
13:30
 1 working on any part of the Highland 4 and 20 project, 
2 because whatever it was they might be doing or the 
3 subcontractors were doing didn't meet your standards? 
4 A No. 
13:31
 5 Q Did you inspect the Highland 4 and 20 project 
6 at any time after the work began? 
7 When I say "work," I mean construction. 
8 A Let's put it this way; I observed. I don't 
9 inspect. 
13:31 io Q Okay. What exactly did you do? You drove out 
11 there; right? 
12 A We would hold monthly meetings. 
13 Q Where? 
14 A On the site. 
13
-3i is Q Where? 
16 A In the construction trailer. 
17 Q In a trailer? And what did those entail? 
18 A We would review the schedule, mostly payment 
19 requests, any subcontractor problems or change orders, 
13:3120 things of that nature. 
21 Q And what else, if anything, did you do? 
22 A We would go out and look at the work that had 
23 been done. 
24 Q You would walk around the site? 
u u u J 2 o 
13:31 25 A Yes . 


























And look at the work that had been done? 
t? What exactly did you do? 
We'd look at it, observe it. 
And would you compare it to your plans or 
Yes . 
For what purpose? 
Make sure it was installed correctly. 
In the Highland 4 and 20 project, was anything 
incorrectly? 
No. 
Were all the components as you specified in 
gns or otherwise? 
When you say "all," you know, we're all human. 
t have caught everything, but to my knowledge, 
Do you recall whether or not you made any 
ders? 
Yes . 
Did you make any change orders? 
I always do. I have yet to build one that we 
What sort of change orders did you make? 
I don't remember right offhand. I'd have to 
. on that project. It's been too long ago to ^-' 
U U If J u, 0 ' 
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on the phone? 
A No . 
Q What? 
A Just tell the contractor, I'm not going to 
accept that subcontractor. 
Q And that would just be oral? 
A Yes. 
Q Hales & Warner could not substitute a 
subcontractor that had been accepted by the LDS Church; 
correct? 
MR. DAVENPORT: Objection; asked and answered. 
Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: I'm trying to figure out what 
you're after. I guess --
Q (BY MR. BADARUDDIN) Let me direct you to 
5 . 1 D. 
It says "the contractor." That would be 
Hales & Warner. 
A That's correct. 
Q Shall not 
A Usually that's in writing. 
Q What is in writing? 
A Substitution of a contractor. 
Q So he will give you the list of subs, which he 
did. And by not objecting, you're accepting them? >olibJ^|4 
VIKI HATTON C3R/RPR 58 
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14:32
 1 A Yes. Or if they could not comply with the 
2 schedule, the subcontractor. 
3 Q You get a list of subcontractors. You could 
4 reject them straightaway or wait for them to get into 
14:32
 5 the project, and if they're just not meeting their time 
6 schedule, you could then reject them? 
7 A Well, the general contractor would then say, 
8 We need to find another subcontractor. Are you okay 
9 with so and so. 
14:32
 10 Q Okay. So Hales & Warner, should not have 
11 substituted any subcontractors unless notifying you that 
12 they were going to do so? 
13- A Right. 
14 Q What does it mean to substitute a 
14:33
 15 subcontractor? 
16 A Put somebody else in their place, another 
17 subcontractor. 
18 (Off-the-record discussion) 
19 MR. BADARUDDIN: That concludes my second set 
i4-.33'20 of questions. I don't know if anyone else has any. 
21 MR. TOLK: I have none. 
22 We'll reserve the right to have Mr. Schick 
23 review the transcript. Send that to our office and 
24 we'll get that to him. 
25 " (Exhibit No. 24 is marked for identification.) 
i -r- _. TT7V 
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A No. 
Q You weren't at the scene of the accident on 
the day of uhe accident? 
A No. 
Q You personally didn't ever instruct any Egbert 
employee to place the subject wall on the bolts in a 
certain method or by way of a certain operative detail, 
did you? 
A No. 
Q Does the LDS Church provide you with an 
overall time frame under which rhey want a project 
completed? 
A Yes . 
have. 
MR. DAVENPORT: That's all the questions I 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MORIARITY: 
Q What time frame did the LDS Church give you on 
this project? 
A I'd have to look for sure. 
Q Where would that be? 
A It might be in that manual. It's probably 
nine months, but it could have been 11 months at that 
time . 
Q You believe it's in the manual? iJUUJ ) o 
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Judge Claudia Laycock 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on August 20, 2003. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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PAGE 1 
that, that Hales and Warner cited over and over, the injury 
causing aspect, or Section 414, then I don't think our, under 
our facts we can meet that standard. But I believe that we 
meet, what we're arguing is a broader standard as articulated 
in paragraphs 18 and 19 that all they have to do is 
participate in the work. 
THE JUDGE: All right. I understand your 
argument. Let me just ask you then, for purposes of my 
understanding that the framework of your argument, you're not 
really, as perhaps you did earlier, arguing that there are 
factual disputes? You know, we really as far as a summary 
judgment goes are we really, I mean, it's an A and B thing so 
we have disputed facts, if there are none then we're talking 
pure law. Is that where you are? 
MR. BADARUDDIN: I think that's where we are. 
But from reading the Hales and Warner's reply memorandum 
they've accused us of taking unfair liberties with the 
facts. And we're entitled to a, we're entitled to any 
reasonable inference from any testimony or fact or evidence. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: So I don't think we're really 
arguing about the facts, I mean— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. I mean as, as I looked at the 
various references to the depositions and, and a, things, it 
looked to me like maybe the only real factual issue was the 




























whether or not there had been some control exerted by Hales 
and Warner over the height of the one wall, the one inch 
difference, and then there was the, how they were going to 
build the wall that was supposed to be raked to meet the 
trusses. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: Right. 
THE JUDGE: And then maybe there was one other 
thing. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: No. Well, Brent Reynolds in his 
deposition made general references to interference and he 
used layman's— 
THE JUDGE: Right. And then those letters. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: Right. 
THE JUDGE: And there was the issue there of 
whether he was just relying on hearsay, and I thought that 
became pretty clear he was relaying complaints he'd heard 
from Brent Reynolds, wasn't really telling things that he 
knew about, but that was Brent Reynolds' complaint. And in 
the end it seemed like in Brent Reynolds' deposition it 
turned into pretty minor stuff. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: Well, no one really, none of 
the witnesses really did well on cross. You could kind of 
get them to admit whatever you wanted. But to the extent 
that that happened, this being summary judgment and us being 
the nonmovant, we go with the evidence that's favorable to 




























all in context and then I'll retake the bench. 
MR. GOOCH: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. DAVENPORT: Thank you. 
(Tape turned off.) 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: All right. We're back on the 
record. It looks like everyone is here. 
First of all, I'd like to thank all the counsel for 
their memos, their briefing and the attachments. As we all 
admitted it took a great deal of time to get through it all. 
And it was spread all over my kitchen table last night until 
about midnight where I do any finest work. 
The... I think all the parties have been well 
represented and a, I think we have effectively today narrowed 
the issues for my consideration. And I think factually, and 
this is what I asked plaintiff's counsel very carefully about 
it, I think factually there is not any dispute here at all. 
I think what it's all coming down to is an interpretation of 
Thompson v. Jess. 
I'm going to outline some facts and I will ask the 
prevailing party to fill in those facts that may put it in 
better perspective, but as I indicated I don't think that we 
have any great facts in dispute. The a... And I don't have 
the dates at the top of my head so I'd ask you to put in the 
dates. 
SMITH VS. HALES & WARNER, et al August 20, 2003 
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Those are page three, four, six and seven of our original 
memorandum that talk about the responsibilities of others who 
inspected the property. 
Thank you. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: By process of elimination if must 
be my turn. 
THE JUDGE: It must be. 
- ARGUMENT BY MR. BADARUDDIN 
MR. BADARUDDIN: I'm not going to spend a lot of 
time with the facts, Judge, because they're, the facts on 
which we rely are kind of listed in a serial fashion in our 
memorandums. But I just wanted to remind the Court that 
basically the, the operative facts I think that are involved 
is Jason Smith, Jose Luis and Michael Lewis were, were 
lifting a wall onto some bolts and in the course of doing so 
the well fell on Jason and Jason was killed. 
Now if their, if Hales and Warner, if 
Mr. Davenport's quotation of a, Thompson versus Jess that, 
that Hales and Warner has to be involved in, in maybe telling 
Jason lift that wall onto those bolts, if that's what 
Thompson versus Jess requires, then we lose. He's, he's 
quoted Thompson versus Jess in this handout and extensively, 
extensively in his brief, and basically he makes frequent 
reference to, Hales and Warner and makes frequent reference 
to the injury causing aspect of the work. 




























We've quoted Thompson versus Jess extensively in 
our brief and we a, frequently refer to basically what, what 
the plaintiff says is the principal employer is liable if he 
actively participates in the work or project, basically 
leaving out that operative, reference to operative detail or 
injury causing aspect. 
So what is it that Thompson says? Well, first 
thing Thompson does is they quote from Section 415 of the 
Second Restatement of Torts. Which by the way is the, 
that's, that's where Hales and Warner's quote came from, 
injury causing aspect, that's comment B, excuse me, comment C 
to section 414 of the Restatement. And the Supreme Court of 
Utah after it quotes section 14 says this doctrine i s — 
THE JUDGE: Will you give me the paragraph so I 
can follow? 
MR. BADARUDDIN: Yes ma'am, Your Honor. Hales 
and Warner is quoting from paragraph 21 if you have the Lexis 
version of this case. 
THE JUDGE: That's my most marked up version. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: And it's at paragraph 979 P.2d at 
327, or paragraph 21. 
THE JUDGE: I've got paragraph 21. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: Okay. Although the requisite 
level? 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 




























these two defendants. 
Now as to the issues of breach, having found that 
there is no duty I don't know that I have to address breach, 
do I? 
MR. DAVENPORT: Well, we prefer you do just 
because in case of an appeal. I don't know, I think it's 
pretty clear, but I think we prevail on those two issues 
too. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: We would just argue that it's not 
before the Court. But breach of what if there's no duty? 
THE JUDGE: Well, I think the way that I've 
approached it where I found that there's actually been no 
duty it leaves me having to say hypothetically if there had 
been a duty then I don't have any facts to support a breach. 
And I just didn't feel from what I had read that that was 
briefed in a manner that I could really make an ultimate 
decision on it. And so I'll hang my hat on, on the finding 
that there's no duty of care on the part of these two 
defendants and leave it at that. 
Is there anything else I need to cover? Which of 
you... Well, I suspect you both want to write your own. 
MR. DAVENPORT: I'll prepare it and circulate it 
to Rob if that's okay. And we'll, and then we'll (short 
inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Are there any legal theories 
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THE JUDGE: Really? 
MR. DAVENPORT: Yes. I think he understands that 
a control, being controlled by someone. I think he can 
understand that it was Egbert Construction personnel that was 
controlling his action at the time. They're the ones that 
told him what to do, versus a Hales and Warner employee 
telling him what to do. I think a construction worker can 
understand what affirmative means as it relates to that 
control. 
But let me just make one other point. I think it 
does go to facts. But, even if you were to strike out that 
fact we still have the affidavit of Michael Lewis saying that 
I was told to do this by Egbert Construction personnel. 
They instructed me to go put that wall into place. There is 
no evidence here that Hales and Warner told them how to put 
that wall into place. There is evidence here before the 
Court that Egbert Construction told them to put the wall into 
place. 
Now, I'd say as it relates to the other affidavits 
submitted we are not here to the extent it has a, a statement 
at the end saying it's my opinion that Hales and Warner were 
not at fault. We're not relying en that type of language. 
Or to the extent it says based upon discussions with other 
people it's my understanding that they don't know of 
anybody. We're not relying on those hearsay statements. 
NOVEMBER 19, 2002 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE 29 
defendant Hales and Warner, wasn't in the vicinity of the 
accident, didn't see how it happened. And I don't see how 
those facts will help this Court determine that not one or 
more of the defendants did not exercise affirmative control 
over the manner, method and means of the injury causing 
aspect of the work. And those are terms I'm sure we're 
going to get into with the a, summary judgment motion. 
With regard to Thomas and the, the alleged hearsay 
statements that were introduced and that the Utah, I think 
it's the Supreme Court considered, those witnesses were 
deposed, they were asked questions about well how do you know 
that and who, who exactly told you to do such and such. We 
haven't that opportunity. And the attorney planning, 
planning meeting order gives us until January 31 to do fact 
discovery and June to do, complete discovery and we haven't, 
straying into our 56(f) motion, we haven't had an opportunity 
to do what the plaintiffs got to do in Thomas. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, at this point let me 
make a decision at least as to these two affidavits. I 
would like to look at the case law on the other. 
The affidavit of Michael Lewis, and this is the 
first one that was submitted, by stipulation of the parties 
and also by my finding that it's hearsay, I will strike the 
second sentence of paragraph four that reads: 
"It is my understanding from 




























then June 30 for everything else. Why would the order do 
that if that, if that amount of time was more than adequate, 
more than sufficient. I submit that the order sets out what 
the parties have agreed is sufficient, and we should have 
what the parties agree is sufficient. 
The Downtown Athletic Club case, Downtown Athletic 
Club versus Harmon the court, a court shouldn't grant summary 
judgment if discovery is incomplete. Our discovery is 
incomplete. 
THE JUDGE: Tell me exactly what you think 
you're going to find in your discovery, or that you should 
find in your discovery that's going to get you past the case 
law. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: Well, the case law doesn't say 
you can't sue a general, well, it doesn't say you can't 
recover against a general contractor or an owner. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. BADARUDDIN: It says if the general contractor 
actively participates or exercises control over the means, 
method, manner of accident causing injury, accident causing 
work, the plaintiff can recover. Those, those are the sort 
of facts we hope to establish. We, I guess we get our start 
with the contract itself which we've objected to. But it 
provides the defendant CPB a variety of rights that are 
inconsistent with its, its insulation from liability. 
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CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant workman, an employee of an independent 
contractor, sought review of an order of the Eighth District, Duchesne County (Utah), 
granting summary judgment to appellee motel owner in appellant's action for damages 
sustained while appellant worked on the property. 
OVERVIEW: Appellee motel owner asked that a pipe be delivered to her motel property. 
When appellant workman, an employee of an independent contractor, arrived, appellee 
asked him to install the pipe. Appellant said that he did not have the preferred tools, but 
agreed to attempt installation. The pipe fell during installation and caused appellant's leg 
to be amputated. Appellant sued, claming that appellee was negligent in her control of 
the situation and in failing to take special precautions. The trial court granted appellee's 
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the court affirmed. Appellee had no duty 
under the "retained control" doctrine because she did not actively participate in the 
performance of the work; she did not impose means or methods of achieving the work, 
but merely stated her desired result: the pipe's installation. The "peculiar risk" and 
"inherently dangerous work" doctrines did not provide theories of relief for appellant, as 
they only applied to innocent third parties injured as a result of the independent 
contractor's negligence. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment; appellee was not liable 
under the "retained control" doctrine because she did not actively participate in the 
and the "peculiar risk" and "inherently dangerous work" doctrines were inapplicable to 
appellant, as he was an employee of the independent contractor. 
CORE TERMS: pipe, contractor, independent contractor, retained control, precautions, 
install, workers' compensation, physical harm, inherently dangerous, duty of care, plywood, 
backhoe, stub, contracted, peculiar risk, subject to liability, subcontractor, hired, owed, duty, 
motel, performing, summary judgment, third parties, installed, chain, general contractor, 
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beams, hires, agreeing 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts - • Hide Concepts 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Summary Judgment Standard*3 
H m ± S u m m a r y judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
l9W. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >De Novo Review 
M I V 2±The appellate court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, according no deference to the court's legal 
conclusions. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors 'm 
H / v 3 ±Utah adheres to the general common law rule that the employer of an independent 
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of 
the contractor or his servants. This general rule recognizes that one who hires an 
independent contractor and does not participate in or control the manner in which 
the contractor's work is performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of 
the manner or method of performance implemented. The most commonly accepted 
reason for this rule is that, where the principal employer does not control the 
means of accomplishing the contracted work, the contractor is the proper party to 
be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk arising out of the work, 
and administering and distributing it. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors lm 
HN4±Jhe retained control doctrine is a narrow theory of liability applicable in the unique 
circumstance where an employer of an independent contractor exercises enough 
control over the contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of care, but not 
enough to become an employer or a master of those over whom the control is 
asserted. The duty in such situations is one of reasonable care under the 
circumstances and is confined in scope to the control asserted. More Like This Headnote 
Labor &. Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors 
HNS&Under the retained control doctrine, one who entrusts work to an independent 
contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability 
for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise 
reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with 
reasonable care. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors %S 
HN6&A principal employer is not subject to liability for injuries arising out of its 
contractor's work unless the employer actively participates in the performance of 
the work. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors "*M 
HN7&under the "active participation" standard, a principal employer is subject to liability 
for injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is 
actively involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of performance of the 
contracted work. Such an assertion of control occurs, for example, when the 
principal employer directs that the contracted work be done by use of a certain 
mode or otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which the work is to 
be accomplished. I t is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the 
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work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make 
suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to 
prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to 
employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods 
Of w o r k , or as to opera t ive deta i l . More Like This Headnote 
Labor 8c Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors l«3 
w w s ± T o have "actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal employer must 
have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that work. 
The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal duty must involve either 
the direct management of the means and methods of the independent contractor's 
activities or the provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury. Although 
the requisite level of control over the contractor's manner or method of work does 
not rise to the level of creating a master-servant relationship, the principal 
employer must exert such control over the means utilized that the contractor 
cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way. A 
typical instance in which such an exertion of control might occur is when a principal 
contractor entrusts a part of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a 
foreman superintends the entire job. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors "m 
W ¥ 9 ±Under Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 413 (1965), one who employs an 
independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to 
create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others 
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused 
to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer fails to provide in the 
contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or fails to exercise 
reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such 
precaut ions . More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors v«d 
HNIO^Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 (1965), one who employs an 
independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely 
to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless 
special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to 
them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such 
precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the 
cont rac t or Otherwise. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors 
HN1J&Under Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 427 (1965), one who employs an 
independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to others which the 
employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or 
which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's 
failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Employer Liability > Tort Liability > Independent Contractors Q 
H / V i 2 ±The purpose of the "peculiar risk" doctrine and the "inherently dangerous work" 
doctrine, under Restatement (Second) of Torts §5 413, 416, and 427 (1965), is to 
ensure that innocent third parties injured by the negligence of an independent 
contractor hired by a landowner to do inherently dangerous work on the land 
would not have to depend on the contractor's solvency in order to receive 
compensation for the injuries. This purpose is not advanced when these 
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exceptions are applied in favor of a contractor's employees who are covered by 
workers' compensation. Thus, the doctrines have no application when the injured 
person is an employee of the independent contractor undertaking the allegedly 
d a n g e r o u s w o r k . More Like This Headnote 
COUNSEL: John Paul Kennedy, Salt Lake City, and David J. Bennion, San Jose, Cal., for 
plaintiff. 
Stephen G. Morgan, Joseph E. Minnock, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
JUDGES: RUSSON, Justice. Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice 
Stewart, and Justice Zimmerman concur in Justice Russon's opinion. 
OPINIONBY: RUSSON 
OPINION: 
[ * * 3 2 3 ] RUSSON, Justice: 
[ *P1 ] Trevor Thompson appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Connie Jess, owner of four motels in Duchesne, Utah. The district court ruled, as a 
matter of law, that Thompson could not recover from Jess for injuries sustained while 
erecting a steel pipe for use as a sign post at one of Jess's motels. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
[ *P2 ] On or about March 9, 1995, Jess phoned AmeriKan Sanitation to arrange for the 
purchase and delivery of a used steel pipe. Jess requested a hollow pipe approximately 20 
feet in length with an 8-inch diameter, one that would fit vertically over an [ * * 3 2 4 ] 
existing pipe stub secured to the ground in front of one of her motels, [ * * * 2 ] which stub 
would support the larger pipe for use as a sign post. After agreeing upon a price, Jess 
requested that the pipe be delivered to her motel. 
Two employees of AmeriKan Sanitation, Dennis Jensen and Trevor Thompson, delivered the 
pipe. When Jensen inquired where to place the pipe, Jess told him she wanted it installed 
over the existing pipe stub. Jensen responded that he had been instructed only to deliver the 
pipe and that he was not equipped to erect it in the best manner. Jess then asked Jensen if 
he would install the pipe, and he agreed to do so, believing he could improvise by hoisting 
the pipe with the winch truck and tools he had with him. 
[ *P4 ] At that point, Jess's involvement in erecting the pipe ceased, and she went inside the 
motel. Jensen, who had hoisted similar pipes more than a hundred times before, determined 
on his own the manner and method of lifting and installing the pipe. For leverage, Jensen set 
up stabilizing poles in an A-frame formation. He then attached to the pipe a "system-seven" 
chain and a hook using a "trucker's hitch" or "logger's hitch"--a method of fastening pipe, 
which Jensen had used many times prior, whereby the weight of the pipe [ * * * 3 ] pulls the 
chain tight. Jensen connected the chain to a winch cable that was strung over the A-frame 
and proceeded to hoist the pipe with the winch attached to his truck. Thompson stood near 
the back of the truck and attempted to guide the elevated pipe onto the pipe stub protruding 
from the ground. 
[ *P5 ] After lifting the pipe as high as this method would allow, Jensen and Thompson 
discovered they were approximately two inches short of being able to raise the pipe over the 
top of the pipe stub. They decided to lower the pipe to the ground and obtain different 
equipment that would lift the pipe the requisite height. In the process of lowering the pipe, 
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however, slack developed in the chain, and the pipe slipped out, bouncing on the ground and 
striking Thompson in the leg. As a result of the injuries sustained from this incident, 
Thompson's leg was amputated below the knee, n l 
Footnotes 
n l Shortly after the accident, Thompson applied for and began receiving workers' 
compensation benefits through his employer, Amerikan Sanitation. 
End Footnotes [***4] 
[ *P6] The day following the accident, Jensen returned to the site with a backhoe and 
erected the pipe without problem using the same chain-hitch method. Both Jensen and 
Thompson, as well as their employer, AmeriKan Sanitation, testified after the accident that 
had they known in advance they would be asked to raise and install the pipe, they would 
have arrived prepared with a backhoe or crane in the first instance. However, after agreeing 
to install the pipe for Jess, neither Jensen nor Thompson informed her that a backhoe or 
crane was necessary to do the job. Rather, as reflected by the record, Jensen simply told 
Jess that although he lacked the best equipment, he would nonetheless erect the pipe. 
Jensen devised his own technique for the task, and Thompson helped him in the attempt. 
[ *P7 ] In April 1997, Thompson filed suit against Jess, alleging that she was negligent in 
the control she exercised over installation of the pipe and in failing to take or require special 
precautions in the performance of the job. After the parties conducted discovery, Jess moved 
for summary judgment, arguing that (1) she did not direct or otherwise control the manner 
or method of installing the pipe, and therefore [ * * * 5 ] owed no duty of care to Thompson or 
Jensen to insure they raised the pipe safely, and (2) she cannot be held vicariously liable for 
the negligent acts of the independent contractor she hired, regardless of whether the work 
involved peculiar risks or was inherently dangerous, because the injuries were suffered by an 
employee of that independent contractor. The district court granted Jess's motion for 
summary judgment, ruling that under Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 284-85, 148 P. 408, 411 
(1914), Jess owed Thompson no duty of protection or warning concerning performance of the 
task because she did not exercise control over the manner or method utilized to install the 
pipe. 
[ *P8 ] On appeal, Thompson contends that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment. Thompson argues that by requesting [ * * 3 2 5 ] that he and Jensen erect the pipe 
when they were not obligated to do so, and by directing them to install the pipe over the 
existing pipe stub, Jess asserted control over the work and thereby assumed a duty of care 
to him under the "retained control" doctrine set forth in section 414 of the Restatement. n2 
Thompson also submits that, under section 413 of the Restatement, the work Jess [ * * * 6 ] 
requested posed "a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others" and that, 
consequently, Jess had a duty to take appropriate safety precautions. By not taking 
measures to ensure the safety of the work, asserts Thompson, Jess breached her duties of 
care under these provisions. Thompson argues that Jess knew or should have known from 
erecting sign posts at her other motels that a crane or backhoe was required to install the 
pole safely. 
- Footnotes 
n2 All Restatement references herein are to Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). 
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- - End Footnotes 
[ *P9 ] As an alternative theory of liability, Thompson posits that even if Jess was not 
directly negligent herself, she nonetheless should be held vicariously liable for the 
contractor's negligence—in this case, the negligence of Thompson's co-worker, Jensen— 
because Jess knew the work she requested involved a peculiar risk of physical harm to 
others. On this point, Thompson urges this court to adopt and apply in his favor sections 416 
and 427 of the Restatement. Section 416 imposes vicarious [ * * * 7 ] liability on the principal 
employer for the contractor's negligence if the employer knows or should know that the work 
involves "a peculiar risk of physical harm to others." Section 427 imposes the same liability 
for work involving "a special danger to others . . . inherent in or normal to the work." 
[ * P 1 0 ] In response, Jess counters that the trial court did not err in granting summary 
judgment because (1) she did not control the manner or method in which Thompson and 
Jensen attempted to lift and install the pole, and therefore owed them no duty of care under 
the "retained control" doctrine; and (2) sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement 
provide causes of action to "others"—meaning innocent third parties—not to employees of the 
independent contractor hired to perform the allegedly dangerous work. 
[ * P 1 1 ] Thus, the principal issues before us are (1) whether Jess owed Thompson a duty of 
care under the "retained control" doctrine, and (2) whether the "peculiar risk" and "inherently 
dangerous work" doctrines under sections 413, 426, and 427 of the Restatement provide 
causes of action in favor of employees of the contractor hired to perform the work at issue. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[ *P12 ] HN11F [ * * * 8 ] Summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Doit, Inc. 
v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). H /V2TWe review the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to the court's legal 
conclusions. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
HNsqp [ * p i 3 ] utah adheres to the general common law rule that "the employer of an 
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or 
omission of the contractor or his servants." Restatement § 409; see Gleason v. Salt Lake 
City, 94 Utah 1, 16, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (1937) (noting applicability of said general rule and 
certain exceptions to it). This general rule recognizes that one who hires an independent 
contractor and does not participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is 
performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of 
performance implemented. See W. Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 509 (5th ed. 
1984). The most commonly accepted reason for this rule is that, where the principal 
employer does not control the means of accomplishing [ * * * 9 ] the contracted work, the 
contractor "is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk 
[arising out of the work] , and administering and distributing it." Id . 
[ *P14 ] In the case at bar, Thompson does not contend that by agreeing to install the pipe 
over the existing pipe stub, he and Jensen [ * * 3 2 6 ] became Jess's employees. Rather, 
Thompson relies entirely on certain exceptions to the general rule of nonliability of an 
employer of an independent contractor: namely, the "retained control" doctrine, and the 
"peculiar risk" or "inherently dangerous work" doctrine. We address each in turn. 
A. "Retained Control" Doctrine 
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[ *P15 ] Thompson charges that Jess should be subject to liability because, by requesting 
that the pipe be erected and instructing that it be installed over the existing pipe stub, she 
controlled and directed the work that caused his injuries. HN4Tln so arguing, Thompson 
on the retained control doctrine, which, as set forth more fully below, is a narrow theory of 
liability applicable in the unique circumstance where an employer of an independent 
contractor exercises enough control over the contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of 
care, [ * * * 1 0 ] but not enough to become an employer or a master of those over whom the 
control is asserted. The duty in such situations is one of reasonable care under the 
circumstances and is confined in scope to the control asserted. 
[*P16] 
In 1965, the American Law Institute promulgated the retained control doctrine as section 414 
of the Restatement, which states: 
§ 414. Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by Employer 
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part 
of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer 
owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control 
with reasonable care. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 414 (1965). This doctrine has not been adopted formally in 
Utah, although similar principles were discussed in this court's early decision of Dayton v. 
Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408, 411-12 (Utah 1914). 
[ *P17 ] In Dayton, this court addressed whether a company that employed an independent 
contractor was liable for injuries sustained by an employee of that contractor during the 
blasting of an underground tunnel. See [ * * * n ] 148 P. at 411-12. Citing a number of 
authorities from other states, the injured employee claimed that because the company, by 
contract, reserved to itself certain rights pertaining to overall management of the contract 
work, "the relation between the company and the contractors was not that of independent, 
but nonindependent, contractors." 148 P. at 411. As a result, argued the injured employee, 
he should be allowed to recover against the company. The court disagreed, stating: 
[The cited authorities] relate to instances and cases where the proprietor or employer 
reserved or exercised the right to superintend, direct or control the work, not only with 
respect to results, but also with reference to methods of procedure or means by which the 
result was to be accomplished, where the will and discretion of the contractor as to the time 
and manner of doing the work or the means and methods of accomplishing the results were 
subordinate and subject to that of the owner or proprietor. We do not find anything in the 
contract or the evidence [identified by the plaintiff] which brings this case within such a rule. 
Id . The court concluded that the injury had been caused by the manner [ * * * 1 2 ] in which 
the work was performed rather than by the nature of the work itself. See 148 P. at 412. 
Because the company exercised no control over the contractor's manner of work, it owed the 
plaintiff no duty to warn or guard him "against dangers incident to or created by the 
prosecution of the work, and certainly not to guard or protect him against the negligence of 
those who had employed him or with whom he labored." Id . 
[ *P18 ] This court has not had opportunity to determine the precedential value of Dayton 
with respect to the retained control doctrine. Several federal courts applying Utah law, 
however, have been called upon to do so. H/V6?Yhose courts uniformly have determined that 
under Dayton, a principal employer is not subject to liability for injuries arising out of its 
contractor's work unless the employer "actively participates" in the performance of the work. 
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For instance, in Simon v. Deery Oil, 699 F. Supp, 257, 258 [ * * 3 2 7 ] (D. Utah 1988), the 
court cited Dayton for the proposition that a principal employer "retaining an independent 
contractor to render services has no duty to warn or train employees of the contractor, nor 
must the principal protect the contractor's [ * * * 1 3 ] employees from the contractor's own 
negligence, unless the principal has 'actively participated' in the project." See also Sewell v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 606 F.2d 274, 276 (10th Cir, 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1080, 62 
L. Ed. 2d 763, 100 S. Ct. 1031 (1980); Texaco, Inc. v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 
1968); Erwin v. Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 6685, *8 
(addressing Utah law on issue). We believe the standard relied upon in these cases is correct, 
and we formally adopt the same. Elaboration on the contours of the standard is needed, 
however. 
«/v/3jp [ * p i 9 ] under the "active participation" standard, a principal employer is subject to 
liability for injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is actively 
involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of performance of the contracted work. See 
Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973) (holding that under "active participation" 
standard, principal employer must directly influence manner in which work is performed; no 
duty arises from "passive nonparticipation"). Such an assertion of control occurs, for 
example, when the principal employer directs that [ * * * 1 4 ] the contracted work be done by 
use of a certain mode or otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which the work 
is to be accomplished. See, e.g., Lewis v. N.J, Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 170 Ariz. 384, 825 
P.2d 5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1992) (imposing liability where subcontractor's employee was injured as 
result of new, less safe method of work required by general contractor); Redinger v. Living, 
Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985) (imposing liability where subcontractor was ordered 
to operate backhoe dangerously close to plaintiff). 
[ * P 2 0 ] The comments to section 414 of the Restatement provide guidance as to the 
"active participation" requirement: 
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the employer must have retained at least 
some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. I t is not enough that he 
has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or 
to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be 
followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved 
to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled [ * * * 1 5 ] as to his 
methods of work, or as to operative detail. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c. (1965) (emphasis added). HNff¥ln other words, 
to have "actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal employer must have 
exercised affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that work. See Grahn v. 
Tosco Corp., 58 Cal. App. 4th 1373, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 897, *37-38, rev. denied, 1998 
Cal. LEXIS 494. "The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal duty must involve 
either the direct management of the means and methods of the independent contractor's 
activities or the provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury." Id . 
[ * P 2 1 ] Although the requisite level of control over the contractor's manner or method of 
work does not rise to the level of creating a master-servant relationship, cf. Restatement § 
414 cmt. a, the principal employer must exert such control over the means utilized that the 
contractor cannot carry out the injury-causing aspect of the work in his or her own way. Cf. 
id. cmt. c. A typical instance in which such an exertion of control might occur is "when a 
principal contractor entrusts a part of the [ * * * 1 6 ] work to subcontractors, but himself or 
through a foreman superintends the entire job." Id. cmt. b. 
[ * P 2 2 ] The requisite level of control over the contractor's work is well illustrated in Lewis, 
825 P.2d at 7-8. There, the general contractor, Riebe, hired the subcontractor, Garges, to 
install a pitched roof constructed of beams and sheets of plywood nailed to the beams. After 
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Garges had already put the plywood in place, Riebe's on-site superintendent told Garges the 
roof was improperly installed and ordered it redone, specifying the use of H -clips to secure 
the plywood. Pursuant to this [ * * 3 2 8 ] instruction, Garges employees began removing the 
nails from each row of plywood, installing H-clips, and then renailing the plywood to the 
beams. Soon thereafter, however, Riebe's superintendent instructed the Garges employees 
to use a different, faster method of dislodging the plywood by banging it from underneath. 
Because this method resulted in plywood being dislodged faster than H-clips could be 
installed, numerous sheets of plywood were left lying loose on top of the beams. A Garges 
employee stepped on the loose plywood and fell through the roof, incurring serious injuries. 
See id. 
[ *P23 ] [ * * * 1 7 ] Thus, in Lewis, the general contractor interfered with the 
subcontractor's method of performing the work and instructed that a quicker but less safe 
method be implemented. A worker was injured as a direct result of the dangerous condition 
created by the general contractor's method. The court concluded, on the basis of these facts, 
that the general contractor exercised sufficient control over the means used in performing 
the contracted work to subject it to retained control liability. See 825 P.2d at 14-15. 
[ *P24 ] Applying these standards to the case at hand, we conclude that Jess did not 
actively participate in the manner in which Thompson and Jensen attempted to lift and install 
the steel pipe. After agreeing to erect the pipe, Jensen, not Jess, determined the method for 
bringing about the desired result. Jensen decided to proceed with the equipment he had with 
him, and by Jensen's own design, he and Thompson set up the A-frame for use as leverage, 
fastened the chain to the pipe using the "trucker's hitch" or "logger's hitch" technique, and 
hoisted the pipe with the winch on Jensen's truck. When this method was unsuccessful, 
Jensen and Thompson attempted to lower the pipe to the [ * * * 1 8 ] ground and, in the 
course of doing so, lost control of the pipe. Thompson's injury was caused by the manner of 
performance, implemented by Jensen, over which Jess exercised no direction, control, or 
supervision. The only control Jess exerted was in directing that the pipe be installed over the 
pipe stub. This amounted merely to control over the desired result, which is insufficient to 
come within the retained control doctrine. 
[ *P25] Particularly revealing is the fact that Jensen returned to the site with a backhoe the 
day after the accident and erected the pipe without incident using the same chain-hitch 
method. Nothing precluded Jensen from retrieving the backhoe before attempting to hoist 
pipe in the first instance. The backhoe was stored only two to three miles away at the time, 
and nothing suggests that Jess required Jensen to install the pipe at the moment of delivery. 
Jensen alone chose to attempt installation of the pipe without a backhoe. 
[ *P26 ] Thus, because Jess did not actively participate in or otherwise exercise affirmative 
control over the manner or method of performance utilized by Jensen and Thompson, she 
owed Thompson no duty of care under the retained control doctrine. [ * * * 1 9 ] n3 The trial 
court was correct in so ruling. 
Footnotes 
n3 We note that the term "retained control" doctrine is somewhat of a misnomer. Under the 
standards announced herein, a duty of care is imposed if the principal employer asserts 
affirmative control over or actually participates actively in the manner of performing the 
contracted work. "Retained," to the extent the word implies passivity or nonaction, is inapt. 
The term "retained control" may have a more syntactically correct application to 
sophisticated parties who, by contract, stipulate which party will control the manner or 
method of work or the safety measures to be taken—such as in contracts between general 
contractors and subcontractors involved in construction projects. See Dayton, 148 P. at 411 
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(noting that under terms of contract, principal employer did not reserve right to direct or 
control prosecution of work or any of contractor's workers). The issue, however, of whether a 
duty of care may be imposed solely as a result of a such a contractual reservation is not 
before us. 
- End Footnotes [***20] 
B. "Peculiar Risk" or "Inherently Dangerous Work" Doctrine 
[ * P 2 7 ] Thompson also relies on sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement and urges 
this court to adopt those sections in his favor as exceptions to the general rule that one who 
employs an independent contractor is not liable for injuries arising out of the contract work. 
These sections are similar in wording and are commonly referred to as the "peculiar risk" 
doctrine, see, e.g., Privette v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 689, [ * * 3 2 9 ] 854 P.2d 721 , 725 
(Cal. 1993) (en banc), or the "inherently dangerous work" exception, see, e.g., Wagner v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 421 N,W.2d 835, 840 (Wis. 1988). 
[ * P 2 8 ] Section 413 is premised on direct liability for a principal employer's negligence in 
failing to insure that special precautions are taken in the contractor's work. That section 
provides: 
§ 413. Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted 
to Contractor 
HN9Tf 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize 
as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to 
others unless special [ * * * 2 1 ] precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer 
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or 
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such 
precautions. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 413 (1965), 
[ * P 2 9 ] Sections 416 and 427 impose vicarious liability on the principal employer for the 
contractor's negligence, even if the employer reasonably provides for precautions in the 
contract work. Those sections state: 
§ 416. Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions 
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize 
as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special 
precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of 
the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the 
employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise. 
§ 427. Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work 
HNinp 
One who employs [ * * * 2 2 ] an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger 
to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the 
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work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take 
reasonable precautions against such danger. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 416, 427 (1965). H / V i 2?The purpose of these sections is 
"to ensure that innocent third parties injured by the negligence of an independent contractor 
hired by a landowner to do inherently dangerous work on the land would not have to depend 
on the contractor's solvency in order to receive compensation for the injuries." Privette, 854 
P.2d at 725, Privette held that this purpose is not advanced when these exceptions are 
applied in favor of a contractor's employees who are covered by workers' compensation. See 
id. at 726-30; see also Wagner, 421 N.W,2d at 840-44 (detailing reasons for not adopting 
sections 413, 416, and 427 in favor of employees of independent contractors). 
[ *P30 ] We agree with Privette and Wagner and decline to apply section 413, 416, 
[ * * * 2 3 ] or 427 of the Restatement in the manner Thompson proposes. Whether based on 
direct negligence under section 413 or vicarious liability under sections 416 and 427, these 
provisions have no application when the injured person is an employee of the independent 
contractor undertaking the allegedly dangerous work. The majority of jurisdictions that have 
examined this issue have decided likewise. n4 
- Footnotes 
n4 See Morris v. City of Soldotna, 553 P.2d 474, 481-82 (Alaska 1976); Welker v, Kennecott 
Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App, 395, 403 P.2d 330, 337-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); Jackson v. Petit 
Jean Elec. Coop., 270 Ark. 506, 606 S.W,2d 66, 69 (Ark, 1980); Privette, 854 P,2d at 726-
3_U Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 548 A.2d 461, 466 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988); Peone 
v. Regulus Stud Mills, 113 Idaho 374, 744 P.2d 102, 105-06 (Idaho 1987); Johns v. New 
York Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d 382, 386-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Dillard v. Strecker, 255 Kan. 
704, 877 P.2d 371, 385 (Kan. 1994); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 
659, 661-63 (Ky. 1973); Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, 76 Md. App. 590, 547 A.2d 1080, 
1082-83 (Md. Ct. Spec. App, 1988); Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 392 Mass. 165, 466 N,E.2d 
500, 502-03 (Mass. 1984); Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 809 S.W.2d 384, 390 
(Mo. 1991) (en banc); Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Rinehart, 99 Nev. 557, 665 P,2d 270, 273-
74 (Nev, 1983); Donch v. Delta Inspection Services, Inc., 165 N.J. Super. 567, 398 A,2d 
.925, 927-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); New Mexico Electric Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89 
N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634, 637-38 (N.M. 1976); Whitaker v. Norman, 75 N.Y.2d 779, 551 
N.E.2d 579, 580, 552 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. 1989); Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 
N.W.2d 445, 449-54 (N.D. 1994); Curless v, Lathrop Co., 65 Ohio App. 3d 377, 583 N.E.2d 
1367, 1376-78 (Ohio Ct, App, 1989); Cooper v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 
Davidson County, 628 S.W.2d 30, 32-33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Humphreys v. Texas Power 
& Light Co., 427 S,W.2d 324, 330-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power 
& Light Co., 96 Wash. 2d 274, 635 P.2d 426, 428-31 (Wash. 1981) (en banc); Wagner, 421 
N.W.2d at 839-44; Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., 733 P.2d 1029, 1031-33 (Wyo. 1987). 
- End Footnotes [***24] 
[ * * 3 3 0 ] P31 Along with Privette and Wagner, Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, 
809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1991) (en banc), is representative of those decisions. As expounded in 
Zueck, if employees of an independent contractor are allowed to avail themselves of the 
peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous work exception, the principal employer is 
placed in an untenable position: he or she must anticipate activities that are "inherently 
dangerous" to the contractor's employees and, if the dangers inhere to the manner in which 
the work is done, protect against such dangers despite the fact that the employees are best 
able to identify and address whatever hazards are involved in their own method of 
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performance. Oftentimes, both the risks involved and the protections necessary to avoid the 
risks are beyond the principal employer's knowledge or capacity. Thus, to avoid the liability 
imposed by the peculiar risk doctrine or inherently dangerous work exception, the principal 
employer has an incentive to direct his or her own employees to do the work despite their 
lack of expertise. Such a choice would limit the principal employer's exposure to that under 
the Workers' Compensation [ * * * 2 5 ] Act but, at the same time, increase the risk of injury 
to the principal's employees and innocent third parties. Placing principal employers in such a 
position distorts the objectives of tort law, and for that reason, the peculiar risk doctrine or 
inherently dangerous work exception should not apply in favor of employees of the 
independent contractor performing the work. See Zueck, 809 S.W,2d at 387-88. 
[ * P 3 2 ] In addition, sections 413, 416, and 427 each speak of liability for injury "to others," 
which implies third parties rather than employees of the independent contractor carrying out 
the contracted work. An early draft of the Restatement included a special note which, though 
ultimately not adopted, provided guidance on this point: 
Special Note. The rules stated in this Chapter are, in general, not applicable to make the 
defendant who hires an independent contractor liable to two classes of persons. 
One consists of the employees, or servants, of the defendant himself. . . . 
The other class of plaintiffs not included in this Chapter consists of employees of the 
independent contractor. . . . One reason why such responsibility has not developed has been 
that the [ * * * 2 6 ] workman's recovery is now, with relatively few exceptions, regulated by 
workmen's compensation acts. . . . While workmen's compensation acts do not infrequently 
provide for third-party liability, it has not been regarded as necessary to impose such liability 
upon one who hires the contractor, since it is expected that the cost of the workmen's 
compensation insurance will be included by the contractor in his contract price for the work, 
and so will in any case ultimately be borne by the defendant who hires him. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Tent. Draft No. 7, Apr. 16, 1962) ch. 15, special note at 17-
18. The American Law Institute omitted this note due to lack of uniformity of the effect of the 
various state workers' compensation acts but indicated nonetheless that "certainly the 
prevailing point of view is that there is no liability on the part of the employer of the 
independent contractor." 39 A . L I . Proc. 244, 247 (1962); see also Monk v. Virgin Islands 
Water & Power Auth., 53 F.3d 1381, 1390-91 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 914, 116 S. 
Ct. 302, 133 L. Ed. 2d 207 (19951 (referring to same language of tentative draft of 
Restatement). 
[ * P 3 3 ] The rationale set forth in the special note quoted above is [ * * * 2 7 ] persuasive 
and provides [ * * 3 3 1 ] additional support for our holding that sections 413, 416, and 427 of 
the Restatement have no application to employees of independent contractors performing the 
work at issue. The phrase "to others" in these sections does not encompass such employees, 
but rather, innocent third parties. This is consistent with the analysis in Dayton and with 
Tenth Circuit case law applying Dayton to this issue. See Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 
634, 636 (10th Cir. 1967) (concluding that phrase "to others" as contained in Restatement § 
413 does not include employees of independent contractors); see also United States v. Page, 
350 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 979, 86 S. Ct. 552, 15 L. Ed. 2d 470 
(1966) (acknowledging that general law on subject reaches same conclusion as to 
Restatement § 427). 
[ * P 3 4 ] Holding otherwise would create unfair and anomalous results under Utah's workers' 
compensation system: 
Courts and legal commentators have expressed concern that to allow an independent 
contractor's employees who incur work-related injuries compensable under the workers' 
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compensation system to also seek damages under the doctrine of peculiar risk from the 
person who [ * * * 2 8 ] hired the contractor would give those employees an unwarranted 
windfall. As these authorities point out, to permit such recovery would give these employees 
something that is denied to other workers: the right to recover tort damages for industrial 
injuries caused by their employer's failure to provide a safe working environment. This, in 
effect, would exempt a single class of employees, those who work for independent 
contractors, from the statutorily mandated limits of workers' compensation. 
Privette, 854 P.2d at 729. Furthermore, given that the exclusive remedy provision of the 
workers' compensation scheme limits the liability of independent contractors to coverage 
premiums, permitting an employee of the contractor to recover tort damages against the 
nonnegligent landowner who employed the contractor would allow for the inequitable result 
that a nonnegligent person's liability for an injury is greater than that of the person whose 
negligence actually caused the injury. n5 
Footnotes 
n5 We note that in Utah, this unfairness is exacerbated by the fact that an employee who 
recovers against a third party is obligated to reimburse the workers' compensation insurer for 
any amounts paid to or on behalf of the employee. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5) 
(1997). Thus, if Thompson recovered from Jess for any negligence of Jensen in raising the 
pipe, he would be required to reimburse AmeriKan Sanitation's insurer for benefits received. 
Such a reallocation would result in Jess's being exclusively liable for Thompson's injuries. 
End Footnotes [***29] 
[ *P35] In the present case, there is no question that Thompson was an employee of the 
independent contractor, AmeriKan Sanitation, at the time of his injury. He was involved in 
attempting to install the pipe and, indeed, has been receiving workers' compensation benefits 
through AmeriKan Sanitation since the accident. We have no reason to question the 
determination (already made as a prerequisite to Thompson's qualifying for such benefits) 
that Thompson was acting within the course of his employment when injured. See Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986) (noting that to qualify for workers' 
compensation benefits, injury must be "by accident" and must arise "in the course of 
employment"). Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that 
Thompson's sole recourse is workers' compensation benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
[ *P36 ] In view of the foregoing analysis, summary judgment in favor of Jess was proper. 
Affirmed. 
[ *P38 ] Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice Stewart, and Justice 
Zimmerman concur in Justice Russon's opinion. 
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